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One of the most serious problems facing physicalism is the explanatory gap 
between physical properties and phenomenal properties of human experience. 
The phenomenal concept strategy is a physicalist response to this problem. 
According to this strategy, the explanatory gap is rooted in the conceptual gap 
between phenomenal concepts and physical concepts，rather than in the 
ontological gap between phenomenal properties and physical properties. In 
other words, advocates of this strategy endorse conceptual dualism while 
insisting on ontological monism. 
This essay is devoted to an investigation into the nature of phenomenal 
concepts and a defense of the phenomenal concept strategy. Chapter 1 
introduces some basic notions and lays out the backgrounds for further 
discussion. Chapter 2 is a critical examination of two different accounts of 
phenomenal concepts. The final chapter clarifies the aims and commitments 
of the phenomenal concept strategy and, along the way, address some 
important objections against the strategy. 
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摘要 
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Chapter 1 Physicalism and its Discontents 
Physicalism (or materialism), is the thesis that everything is physical, or, to put it 
in another way, there is nothing over and above the physical. Physicalism is 
widely held in contemporary philosophy, but this does not mean that it has never 
been challenged. Quite the contrary, in the last 30 years or so, serious doubts has 
been casted on physicalism. The doubt, in essence, is that whether the subjective 
or phenomenal aspect of human experience, such as the feeling of pain, is 
physical. Or even if it is granted that subjective experience is ultimately physical, 
it still seems extremely difficult, or even impossible, to understand or explain why 
this can be the case. In other words, it is puzzling or even mysterious that the 
phenomenal experience should arise from the underlying physical structure. This 
is the major discontent about physicalism that I am going to discuss in this essay. 
Many physicalists have attempted to solve this puzzle by appealing to the 
distinct features of phenomenal concepts—concepts that refer to phenomenal 
experiences from the first person perspective, and contrasting them with physical 
concepts. This strategy is called the phenomenal concept strategy (PCS) (Stoljar， 
2005). The strategy does not aim to explain phenomenal properties in physical 
terms, rather, it is argued precisely that this cannot be done because phenomenal 
concepts and physical concepts are conceptually isolated. That is, according to 
advocates of the strategy, we have two sharply different ways to conceive 
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properties; correspondingly, there is an explanatory gap between our knowledge 
of phenomenal properties and our knowledge of physical properties. In other 
words, those pursuing this strategy endorse conceptual dualism (phenomenal 
concepts are conceptually isolated from physical concepts) while insisting on 
ontological monism (i.e, that phenomenal properties are physical). 
The above characterization of physicalism and the phenomenal concept 
strategy is obviously preliminary. There are many issues surrounding these 
important and difficult topics, some of which will unfold later. But here let me 
make clear the purposes and structure of this essay: it is devoted to (1) an 
investigation into the nature of phenomenal concepts; (2) a defense of the 
phenomenal concept strategy. Before exploring these core issues, I will first 
introduce, in Chapter 1, some basic concepts and ideas that set the stage for the 
debate, laying out the backgrounds for further discussion. Chapter 2 will provide 
an exposition of two accounts of phenomenal concepts and a defense of what I 
call the Loarian recognitional account, in chapter 3,1 will clarify further the aims 
and commitments of the phenomenal concept strategy and, along the way, address 
some important objections. 
1.1 Physicalism 
1.1.1 Two Problems in Characterizing "Physicalism" 
As noted above, physicalism is the thesis that there is nothing over and above the 
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physical. But it is a matter of controversy how this thesis is to be elaborated. In 
particular, there are two kinds of questions that any adequate elaboration of 
physicalism should address: First, what does it mean for something to be physical! 
Second, what does it mean for nothing to be over and above the physical? These 
two questions parallel what Daniel Stoljar calls the condition question and the 
completeness question. The first is about the condition of being physical, and the 
second "holds fixed the issue of what it means for something to satisfy the 
condition ofbeing physical, and asks instead of what it means for everything to be 
physical." (Stoljar 2009) 
Both questions have drawn a great deal of critical attention, and I do not 
expect to settle any of them here. Fortunately, for our purpose, we can start off 
with an intuitive grasp of the idea of physicalism and the problems facing it. 
Therefore, my introduction to conceptual preliminaries for the next two chapters 
will be as succinct as possible, focusing on the main dialectics between 
anti-physicalists (or dualists) and advocates ofPCS. 
1.1.2 The Formulation ofPhysicalism 
I use "the physical" broadly: typically, it includes the properties studied in 
physical sciences, but it also includes those studied in some domains ofbiology in 
a broad sense (e.g. physiology, neuroscience. etc). Some prominent advocates of 
phenomenal concept strategy use "physical-functional" rather than "physical" to 
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characterize physicalism (Loar 1997，McLaughlin 2001)，but this difference is 
only terminological. Hereafter, I'll use "physical" and "physical-functional" 
interchangeably. 
In recent literature, physicalism is customarily formulated in terms of 
supervenience. This example by David Lewis serves well to illustrate the idea of 
supervenience: 
A dot-matrix picture has global properties — it is symmetrical, it is 
cluttered, and whatnot 一 and yet all there is to the picture is dots and 
non-dots at each point of the matrix. The global properties are nothing but 
patterns in the dots. They supervene: no two pictures could differ in their 
global properties without differing, somewhere, in whether there is or there 
isn't a dot (Lewis 1986: 14). 
Roughly put, the idea is that, property A supervenes on property B if it is 
impossible for two things to be alike with respect to B but differ with respect to A. 
Many theorists apply this idea to formulate physicalism: 
Supervenience Physicalism: Mental properties supervenience on physical 
properties in that any two worlds indiscernible in physical properties are 
indiscernible in mental properties.' 
1 For more on supervenience physicalis, see Horgan (1993), Jackson (1998)，Wilson (2005) 
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Supervenience physicalism is a thesis about the mind-body relation, and it is 
customarily associated with the idea that mental properties depend on or are 
determined by physical properties. However, mind-body supervenience in itself 
does not explain the relation (e.g, why the mental supervenes on the physical; 
what is the nature of the dependence). As Jaegwon Kim observes, "mind-body 
supervenience is consistent with a host of classic positions on the mind-body 
problem; in fact it is a shared commitment of many mutually exclusionary 
mind-body theories." (Kim 1998:12). For instance, functionalists could explain 
the mind-body supervenience in terms of functional realization;^ identity theorists 
could explain the mind-body supervenience in terms of mind-body identity�. Even 
some dualists can embrace mind-body supervenience: for example, it seems 
coherent to hold that, first, mental properties are distinct from physical properties, 
second, mental properties are in some way necessitated by, and thus supervene on, 
physical properties.^ 
Partly for this reason, some theorists (e.g. Wilson 2005) complain that the 
supervenience-based formulations of physicalism do not rule out dualism, and 
thus fail to state the sufficient condition for physicalism. Whether this kind of 
complaint is justified is a complicated issue that we cannot deal with here; in any 
case, our present purpose is not to offer a sufficient and necessary condition for 
2 The idea, roughly, is this: mental properties are functional roles. Suppose a mental property 
M is identical to a functional role, F. M is realized by certain physical properties P in that the 
functional role F is performed by P. M supervenes on P because, for any world, i f P is instantiated, 
then F is performed. Therefore, M is instantiated too. 
3 See below identity physicalism. 
4 This is the view of some emergentists. See McLaughlin (1997) 
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physicalism, but only to characterize it in a way that enables us to grasp the idea 
of explanatory gap. 
For the ease of exposition, then, my primary focus in this e s s a / will be 
what I call identity physicalisnf: 
Identity Physicalism: For any mental property M, there is a physical 
property P such that M=P7 
One important virtue of identity physicalism is that the relation of identity is 
clearer and better understood than supervenience. Partly for this reason identity 
physicalism is more vulnerable to the anti-physicalist attacks. Therefore，using 
identity physicalism as the formulation of physicalism will make it easier to bring 
the physicalism/anti-physicalism controversy into focus. 
1.2 The Explanatory Gap 
Intuitively, neural processes and the phenomenal character of experience are very 
different. It is hard to see, for example, how the qualitative character of pain can 
be identical with, or somehow realized by, the stimulation ofcorresponding neural 
5 A notable exception is section 3.1，where I address Stoljar's objections to the phenomenal 
concept strategy, because he uses supervenience physicalism as a target. But this is no problem, 
for supervenience physicalism is a broader conception ofphysical ism than identity physicalism, 
and i f the broader can be protected, so is the narrower one ， 
6 Identity physicalism (also called "type physicalism") can be traced back to the works of 
U.T.Place (Place 1956), H. Feigl, (Feigl 1958), and J.J.C. Smart (Smart 1959). 
Obviously, identity physicalism entails supervenience physicalism. But the reverse does not 
hold, since supervenience can be interpreted in terms ofvarious ways other than mind-body 
identity, as mentioned earlier. 
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fibers. Moreover, even if pain in fact is C-fiber stimulation, this 
identification一unlike typical theoretical identifications, e.g. water is 
H2O—seems arbitrary and inexplicable. Call this kind of intuition "the dualistic 
intuition." 
A more common notion in recent literature that captures the dualistic 
intuition is "explanatory gap": that there is a gap between, on the one hand, 
physical truths, truths about physical entities or properties studied in science, and, 
on the other, phenomenal truths, truths about the phenomenal qualities of our 
experience, in that the physical (or for that matter, the neurological) cannot 
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explain the phenomenal truth. To flesh out this idea, it is better to start with 
some manifestations of the gap. 
1.2.1 The First Manifestation of the Explanatory Gap: Mary's New 
Knowledge 
From birth, Mary is restricted in a black and white room. However, she manages 
to leam, through black-and-white books, black-and-white televisions and 
computers, everything about the physics, chemistry, and physiology of color 
perception and become a color scientist. That is, she has complete knowledge 
about physical facts underlying color perception. 
When she is released from the black-white room, she sees something red, say, 
8 For convenience, sometimes I will also speak of"the explanatory gap between the mental 
and physical", or "the explanatory gap between mental properties and physical properties" 
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a ripe tomato. It seems clear that at this time, Mary leams something new, namely, 
what it is like to see red. This is something that black-and-white Mary does not 
know when she is confined in the room. Therefore, although she has learn 
everything physical about color experience, she does not thereby know the 
phenomenal character, the "what it is like" of reddish experience. 
Based on this imagined case, Frank Jackson concludes that phenomenal 
character is not physical. To summarize his argument: 
(1) (Black-and-white) Mary knows everything there is to know about brain 
states and their properties. 
(2) It is not the case that Mary knows everything there is to know about 
sensations and their properties. 
Therefore, 
(3) Sensations and their properties is not brain states and their properties. 
(Jackson 1986f 
1.2.1 The Second Manifestation of the Explanatory Gap: The 
Conceivability of Zombies 
The conceivability argument (sometimes also called modal argument) have its 
root in Descartes' argument for (substance) dualism in the Meditations. In the past 
9 This is Jackson's knowledge argument against physicalism. 
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decade or so, the interest in the argument is revived, largely due to David 
Chalmers，zombie argument (which is supposed to be an argument for property 
dualism rather than substance dualism). 
Zombies, it is said, are physically identical to conscious beings, but they lack 
phenomenal experience. In Chalmers' words: 
...their brain processes will be molecule-for-molecule identical with the 
original, and their behavior will be indistinguishable. But things will be 
different from the first-person point of view...And there is nothing it is like 
to be a Zombie. (Chalmers 2002: 249) 
According to Chalmers, zombies are conceivable. Correspondingly, he 
argues, a zombie world, namely, a physical duplicate of our world but in which 
there is no consciousness, is conceivable too. The argument can be summarized as 
follows: 
(1) It is conceivable that there be zombies. 
(2) If it is conceivable that there be zombies, it is metaphysically possible that 
there be zombies. 




(4) Physicalism is fa lse�� . 
A crucial step of the argument is (2), the inference from conceivability to 
possibility. That is, if a zombie world is conceivable, then it is possible. To put 
things a little more dramatic: supposing the conceivability, it is possible for an 
omnipotent God create such a world. But then, if a zombie world is possible, 
physicalism is false, since physicalism is the thesis that any phenomenal property 
is identical to some physical property." 
1.2.3 The Epistemic (Explanatory) Gap and the Ontological Gap 
Both the knowledge argument and the conceivability argument aim to draw a 
metaphysical conclusion: phenomenal properties are not physical, and thus 
physicalism is false. As noted by Chalmers, they also share a common structure: 
both start from an epistemic or explanatory gap (I will use the two terms 
interchangeably), and proceed to an ontological gap between the physical and the 
phenomenal (Chalmers 2002:250). In the knowledge argument, the explanatory 
gap is manifested in Mary's inability to get from physical knowledge to 
phenomenal knowledge. In the conceivability argument, the gap is manifested in 
the conceivability of creatures lacking conscious experience but otherwise 
identical with humans. From these epistemic premises, the arguments derive an 
ontological gap. 
'° For a recent and more detailed presentation the argument, see Chalmers 2009. 
The zombie argument can also be raised against supervenience physicalism, which also 
entails that the zombie world is impossible. 
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There is a major divide among physicalists in their responses to the argument 
of this kind: some deny the explanatory gap thus blocking the inference to the 
conclusion that Mary learns anything new after her release or that zombies are 
conceivable. These theorists are what Chalmers calls type-A materialists 
(Chalmers 1996, 2002). Another group of physicalists acknowledge the 
epistemic/explanatory gap, i.e. that we cannot derive, on a priori grounds, 
phenomenal truths from physical truths. Yet, they deny that such a gap entails an 
ontological one. That is, they hold that Mary's new knowledge does not entail that 
there are two different kinds of facts to be known or that zombies, though 
conceivable, are metaphysically impossible. They are, in Chalmers’ words, type-B 
materialists. 
Type-A materialism is an important form of physicalism, but in this essay, my 
focus will be exclusively on the other camp, for proponents of the phenomenal 
concept strategy are type-B materialists. Let's now tum to the nature of 
explanatory gap. 
1.2.4 Levine on the Explanatory Gap 
In early 1980s, Joseph Levine raised the problem of explanatory gap for 
physicalism (Levine 1983). In his recent work (Levine 2001), he further 
articulates the problem. Unlike the knowledge argument and conceivability 
argument, Levine argues, the explanatory gap argument is not (for Levine himself 
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at least) supposed to be a refutation of physicalism, which is a metaphysical thesis; 
rather, it aims to show that physicalism faces a genuine epistemic or explanatory 
problem. 
First of all, he observes, 
Science is in the business of explanation. We want to know not only that 
such-and-such is the case, but also why it is the case. If nature is one large, 
lawful, orderly system, as the materialist (or naturalist) insists in its, then it 
should be possible to explain the occurrence of any part that system in terms of 
the basic principles that govern nature as a whole. (Levine 2001: 69) 
Therefore, if physicalism is true, it is reasonable to expect that scientists would 
one day be able to explain everything in the world, including consciousness or 
qualia. But what is explanation? According to Levine, explanation has both a 
metaphysical aspect and an epistemological aspect. Metaphysically, phenomenon 
A is explained by B just in case that B is responsible for (the occurrence of) A, or 
that A occurs in virtue o /B . Epistemologically, A is explained by B just in case 
that we can understand why A occurs on the basis ofB. In other words, A is made 
intelligible by B. For Levine, explanation is a matter of deduction: 
...in a good scientific explanation, the explanans either entails the 
explanandum, or it entails a probability distribution over a range of 
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alternatives, among with explanandum resides. In other words, I take 
explanation to essentially involve deduction. (Levine 2001: 74) 
There is a complication concerning deduction and explanation. It seems that, the 
failure of deduction from one set of statements to another does not necessarily 
mean that there is an explanatory gap between the two. For instance, from a set of 
purely descriptive statements, no matter how rich, we cannot derive any statement 
containing indexicals (e.g. here, I，now, that).^^ For example, suppose there is a 
true description that states, only in non-indexical terms, everything about Hong 
Kong. From this description alone, we cannot derive "Hong Kong is this place" 
even if we are in Hong Kong. Other information is required to reach the 
conclusion that "Hong Kong is this place" (e.g. we need to go out to see what the 
place is like). On the other hand, once we become aware of the fact that Hong 
Kong is the place we are now in, it is unlikely that we will wonder "But how 
Hong Kong could be this place?" lf Hong Kong is this place, then it is this place. 
Nothing seems to be in need of explanation.'^ 
The reason, I think, is that indexicals do not have much cognitive 
s i g n i f i c a n c e , i 4 ^^^ ^ y possessing an indexical that refers to something, we do not 
thereby acquire much information about that thing. In contrast, it seems that to 
12 See Perry(1979). 
13 Similarly, we will not wonder "How 12:00 p.m. of Jun 18*，2010 could be nowT i f w e 
know that it is 12:00 p.m. ofJun 18(^ , 2010 now. 
14 In Levine's words, the mode of presentation ofindexicals is "thin". Levine also thinks 
natural kinds are similar to indexicals in this respect, but I'll neglect this issue for the sake of 
simplicity. 
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possess a phenomenal concept, '^  one has to know something much more 
substantive. Consider, for example, Mary's new knowledge. Hence, the 
phenomenal-physical identification typically strikes us as in need of explanation, 
and, Levine argues, since phenomenal truths are not derivable from physical 
truths, there is an explanatory gap between the two. 
In any case, Levine's basic idea is clear: good scientific explanation enables 
us to understand a phenomenon because it enables us to expect its occurrence on 
the basis of the information available. Take, for example, the boiling point of 
water at sea level: 
Molecules ofH2O move about at various speeds. Some fast-moving 
molecules that happen to be near the surface of the liquid have sufficient 
kinetic energy to escape the intermolecular attractive forces that keep the 
liquid intact. These molecules enter the atmosphere. That's evaporation. The 
precise value of the intermolecular attractive forces ofH2O molecules 
determines the vapor pressure ofliquid masses ofH2O, the pressure exerted 
by molecules attempting to escape into saturated air. As the average kinetic 
energy of the molecules increases, so does the vapor pressure. When the 
vapor pressure reaches the point where it is equal to atmospheric pressure, 
large bubbles form within the liquid and burst forth at the liquid's surface. 
The water boils. (Levine 2001: 79) 
15 For more on the nature of phenomenal concepts, see chapter 2. 
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Given sufficient microphysical truths about H2O at the sea level (e.g. the kinetic 
energy, the atmosphere pressure at sea level, etc.), one would expect when it will 
boil. Levine's also puts this point about explanation in terms of conceivability: 
"given a sufficiency rich elaboration of the story above, it is inconceivable that 
H2O should not boil at 212°F (assuming, again, that we keep the rest of the 
chemical world constant)" (Levine 2001: 79). For Levine, conceivability and 
explanation are closely connected: if there is an explanation of A in terms of B, 
then it is inconceivable that B occur without A. In other words, if it is conceivable 
for B to occur without A, then B cannot explain A. (The conceivability argument, 
it is worth noting, relies on the inference from conceivability to possibility.) 
According to Levine, it is conceivable that a physical or a neurological state 
occurs without the relevant phenomenal state that it typically brings out. Suppose 
I look at a red tomato and have a reddish experience: scientists can describe how 
light stimulates my retina in a particular way and how this eventually brings about 
some neural events in my visual cortex. But as Levine points out: "No matter how 
rich the neurophysiological story gets, it still seems quite coherent to imagine that 
all that should be going on without there being anything it's like to undergo the 
state in question." (Levine 2001: 79) More generally, "There seems to be no 
discernible connection between the physical description and the mental one, and 
thus no explanation of the latter in terms of the former." (Levine 2001: 77) 
To sum up this section: since it is conceivable that physical facts exist 
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without the relevant phenomenal facts, there is an explanatory gap between the 
mental and the physical. However, if physicalism is true，it is reasonable to expect 
that scientists could in some way explain phenomenal facts just as they explain 
other facts. Therefore, even if physicalism is true as a metaphysical thesis, it is 
confronted with a serious epistemological trouble, i.e. how the mental can be 
explained in terms of the physical. 
This is where the phenomenal concept strategy kicks in. Its aim is precisely 
to show how this epistemic puzzle arises and how the physicalist can live with it. 
1.3 The Phenomenal Concept Strategy (PCS): The Basics 
Briefly put, the phenomenal concept strategy is a package of three main doctrines: 
(D1) Physicalism is true a posteriori. 
(D2) The explanatory gap between physical truths and phenomenal 
truths arises from the conceptual gap between the phenomenal 
concepts and physical concepts. 
(D3) The conceptual gap can be accounted in a way that is compatible 
with physicalism. 
D1 is not difficult to understand. According to the proponents of PCS, the 
truth of physicalism is not to be established by conceptual analysis: there is 
nothing conceptually incoherent to conceive a zombie world or a dualist world (a 
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world where mind and body are distinct substance as Descartes believed). Rather, 
physicalism is to be established by a posteriori or empirical considerations, e.g. 
the simplicity and overall explanatory strength of physicalist ontology, and the 
causal-closure of the physical” 
D2 is the major subject of this essay. Proponents of PCS need to explain the 
nature of phenomenal concepts and physical concepts and why there is a 
conceptual gap between them. I will defend an account of phenomenal concepts 
in Chapter 2 and explain the conceptual gap in Chapter 3. To anticipate, the basic 
ideas are as following. First, phenomenal concepts are first personal concepts that 
refer to phenomenal properties on the basis of introspection. Second, via 
introspection, we are able to conceive our own phenomenal states in a particularly 
immediate way (I shall call this "phenomenal acquaintance"), 口 without 
appealing to any other properties, and a fortiori physical-functional properties. 
Third, the way we conceive phenomenal properties is thus cognitively isolated 
from the way we conceive physical properties, therefore, there is no a priori link 
between phenomenal concepts and physical concepts. 
Lastly, to be a physicalist strategy, PCS has to account for conceptual gap in 
way that is compatible with physicalism. Therefore, PCS is committed to D3. 
Some serious questions have been raised against D3 recently, and I will try to 
address some of them in the second half of Chapter 3. 
16 Roughly put, the causal-closure principle is: every event that has a cause has a sufficient 
physical cause. Many physicalists regard it as an empirical principle (MeInyk 2001, Papineau 
2002). The argument from causal-closure is perhaps the dominant argument for physicalism. The 
argument has another two premises: that mental events cause physical events, and that the physical 
effects ofmental events are not overdetermined. It fol lows from these and the causal-closure 
principle that mental events are physical. 
'' To be sure, not all versions o f P C S give as much weight to phenomenal acquaintance as I do. 
For these proposals, see Perry (2001), Levin (2007). However, as I see it, the most promising 
versions o f P C S do rely on something like phenomenal acquaintance in my sense. See Loar (1997, 
2003, 2007), Papineau (2002，2007)，Balog (Forthcoming). 
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Chapter 2 Two Accounts of Phenomenal Concepts 
In this chapter, I will set out the major two accounts of phenomenal concepts (the 
quotational account and the recognitional/demonstrative account) and defend a 
version of the second (I shall call it the Loarian recognitional account). The aim 
of this chapter is to lay down the ground for further discussion, namely, whether 
the phenomenal concept strategy can save physicalism from the attacks mentioned 
earlier. This question will be addressed in chapter 3. For now, my focus is the 
explications of the nature of phenomenal concepts as such, rather than PCS's 
defense of physicalism. In a way, the accounts discussed here are neutral with 
regard to the physicalist-antiphysicaIist debate. One of the most prominent 
dualists, David Chalmers, advocates a version of the quotational account 
(Chalmers 2003). 
2.1 The Quotational Account ofPhenomenal Concepts 
2.1.1 The Quotation Analogy 
The quotational account of phenomenal concepts is sometimes called the 
constitutional account (Balog 2009)，for, it is said, a phenomenal experience 
partially constitutes the phenomenal concept. However, I prefer to use "the 
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quotational account" rather than "the constitutional account", for two related 
reasons: first, the term "constitution" is obscure, and, as I will explain later, there 
is a sense of constitution that is acceptable to the Loarian recognitional account 
(2.2.6); second, the analogy with linguistic quotation highlights the most distinct 
feature of this approach, and thus makes it easier to get a flavor of the basic 
underlying ideas. 
Let us first consider the application of quotation mark in expressions such as 
“@”. The expression incorporates the symbol @ as a part, and also refers to the 
symbol itself. To be more precise, the expression quotes a token of symbol @ and 
refers to the symbol type exemplified by the token. Moreover, "@"in refers to 
type-@ in virtue of the token-@ it quotes. 
According to the quotational account, phenomenal concepts can be understood 
in a similar way, although their "quotation" apparatus is obviously quite different 
from that of linguistic quotation. The idea can be called mental quotation. 
Mental quotation: a phenomenal concept quotes an instance of phenomenal 
experience if it refers to that very kind of experience in virtue to the instance 
quoted. 
It is unclear, however, what "quote" means here. We will return to this point 
later, but for the present purpose, we shall satisfy ourselves at an intuitive level. 
That is, assuming the concepts are mental representations (although most theorists 
ofthe camp accept this assumption, none ofthe elaborations and arguments below 
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depends on it), phenomenal concepts are mental representations that contains 
instances of what are represented. As Block puts it, (in the fundamental use of a 
phenomenal concept) "an instantiation of a phenomenal property is used in the 
concept to pick out a phenomenal property (a type).，，(Block 2007: 253) 
2.1.2 The Fundamental Use and Derived Use 
Obviously, it is impossible that in every use of a phenomenal concept, the 
corresponding experience must be present, for that would make ordinary thoughts 
such as "I'm not in pain now." necessarily false. Therefore, theorists (Chalmers 
2003, Papineau 2007, Block 2007) generally distinguish between the fundamental 
use and derived (or non-fundamental) use of phenomenal concepts, though they 
do not put things in the same terms. 
The fundamental use of phenomenal concepts, according to Block, is the use 
where an actually occurring phenomenal experience is deployed to constitute (at 
least partially) a concept that picks out the very kind of experience. Let 
"phenomenal redness" be the phenomenal character of reddish experience or the 
experience of seeing red things. The idea is that, when one is thinking about the 
phenomenal redness of a current reddish experience, the reddish experience itself 
is involved in the concept of phenomenal redness. In other words, the reddish 
experience itself is "quoted" in one's thought about that very property of 
phenomenal redness. Therefore, the reddish experience plays two roles in this 
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situation: first, it is a component of one's thought about a phenomenal property 
(so it is at the level of thought); second, it is also an instance of the phenomenal 
property that very thought is about (so it is at the level of the object of thought in 
the meantime). 
For some theorists (e.g. Papineau 2002, 2007), the fundamental uses of 
phenomenal concepts also includes cases where the "quoted" phenomenal 
experiences are memorized, recreated or imagined. For our current purpose, it 
does not matter which definition is the best. What is crucial is that, on both 
proposals, there is an instance of experience, whether it is actually occurring or 
recreated by imagination, incorporated in the corresponding phenomenal concept. 
Therefore, we can define the fundamental uses of phenomenal concepts in terms 
of mental quotation: 
The fundamental use of a phenomenal concept is the use where a 
phenomenal concept (mentally) quotes a particular instance (an occurring 
experience, or faint copy of in recreation or imagination) of phenomenal 
experience. 
In contrast, there are also non-fundamental or derived uses of phenomenal 
concepts. For example, I may think "I'm not in pain now.", or Mary could tell 
others about her new experience ("That kind of experience is so different from 
what I am used to in the black-white room!”）without recalling the experience into 
her mind. 
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In the following discussion, otherwise noted, I will focus on the fundamental 
use of phenomenal concepts, as it involves the most distinct idea, namely, mental 
quotation, of this approach. 
2.1.3 Why Mental Quotation? 
It is natural for readers to wonder why these theorists put forward the quotational 
account of phenomenal concepts, since the notion of mental quotation seems quite 
obscure, if not strange. As I see it, there are at least two underlying considerations 
that motivate such proposal. Proponents the quotational account claims that they 
can explain: 
First: the Conceptual Gap between physical and phenomenal concepts. It is 
said that the explanatory gap (As manifested in the color scientist Mary's new 
knowledge and the conceivability of zombies. See 1.2) is rooted in this conceptual 
gap. 
Obviously, the existence of a conceptual gap does not imply that a 
recognitional concept are disconnected with any physical concept, or that the two 
sets of concepts cannot be connected in forming meaningful thoughts; quite the 
contrary, many of our beliefs about the world are resulted from the combination of 
the two kinds of concepts.( as expressed by "the genetic structure of that kind of 
tree is different is similar for to elm", "that kind of car uses carbon free energy.，，） 
This point is rather that, there is no a priori link between the recognitional and the 
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physical concept of the same property. 
Whatever mental quotation is, it seems obvious that typical physical 
concepts do not "quote" their referents. Nearly all proponents of the quotational 
account make it fairly clear that phenomenal concepts are unique is this respect. 
The difference in constitution makes a prima facie strong case for the conceptual 
gap between phenomenal concepts and physical concepts. Moreover, since a 
phenomenal concept refers to a phenomenal quality simply in virtue of the 
instance of that very quality, and it is not associated a priori with any 
causal-functional role, naturally, we would expect, a phenomenal concept is 
isolated from any physical concept. 
Second: the Possession Condition for phenomenal concepts. To possess a 
phenomenal concept, one must have actually undergone the corresponding 
experience. For this reason, Mary lacks the phenomenal concept of phenomenal 
redness before her relief. 
It seems that the possession condition for phenomenal concepts as 
characterized above is obviously true. And, again, the quotational account can 
explain why it is so: since a phenomenal concept is constituted by certain 
phenomenal experience, a necessary condition for a subject to acquire a 
phenomenal concept is having actually undergone the corresponding experience. 
To be fair, these two considerations are shared by recognitonal/demonstrative 
account (RD account) of phenomenal concepts, though they approach the issues 
differently. However, some advocates of quotational account claim that the RD 
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account fails to explain why it is a relevant priori experience is necessary for the 
possession of a phenomenal concept. The reason is that, a recognitional concept 
refers in virtue of the causal-recognitional relation between the concept and its 
referent (more on this, see 2.2). That is, a recognitional concept is first formed on 
the basis ofthe causal contact with an object, and the corresponding recognitional 
disposition to classify similar objects as belonging to the same kind. Suppose I 
acquire, through actual perceptual contact (that is, through actually seeing a 
panda), a recognitional concept of panda, THAT KIND OF MAMMAL, and I am 
disposed to recognize creatures of similar appearance as THAT KIND OF 
MAMMAL. However, Balog complains, the causal-recognitional relation 
...leaves too much o f a distance between, for example, a basic application of 
the PC [phenomenal concept] pain to a particular pain as it occurs and the 
particular pain itself, as on this view their occurrence is independent. In 
particular, it is conceivable on this account that a basic application of pain be 
tokened by someone in the complete absence of pain. But it seems that this is 
really inconceivable. Anybody who tokens a basic application of pain is really 
in pain." (Balog, 2009:305) 
Balog's term "basic application" equals our "fundamental use". Her contention is 
that, if a phenomenal concept is a recognitional concept, and it picks out a 
particular pain solely in virtue of causal-recognitional relation, then the concept 
and the phenomenal state are independent existences, for a cause and its 
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consequences are distinct. It is then possible to have a recognitional concept of 
pain without having actual connection with it, that is, to have pain. Similarly, we 
may have a recognitional concept of panda solely in virtue of seeing a photo of a 
panda. But this conflicts the possession condition of phenomenal concepts: to 
possess a phenomenal concept, one must have had corresponding experience. 
It is true that, in a sense, the quotation relation is "closer" than the 
causal-recognitional relation in general, but this is compatible with there being a 
special kind of causal-recognitional relation that shares, at least to a sufficient 
degree, the intimacy between a concept and its referent. Later (see, in particular, 
2.2.6 and 2.2.7) I will defend a version of RD account that captures, at least to a 
sufficient degree, such intimacy. For now, however, I will grant Balog's point and 
explore some problems of the quotational account. 
2.1.4 Problems of the Quotational Account 
To give an example of the quotational account, let us consider Papineau's 
proposal, which is most detailed version of the approach. According to him, a 
phenomenal concept is the combination of what he calls the experience operator, 
viz. "the experience ，’，and a token experience, which fills in the blank space of 
the operator. The token experience in question is either a concurrent experience 
that one is thinking about, or created by memory or imagination (Papineau 2002: 
116). 
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Unfortunately, this formulation seems too metaphorical. I have to admit that 
I am by no means sure about "experience operator" and "filling into the blank", or 
how they figure into the general cognitive architecture. Sometimes, it seems to me 
that so-called mental quotation is something like introspective ostentation, and to 
mentally quote something means nothing more than introspectively attend to it 
and bring it under focus. Mental quotation would seem less mysterious if 
interpreted this way, but there is a price for this move: it is compatible with the 
RD account, according to which introspective ostentation or demonstration also 
plays a crucial role in the formation the RD concept of experience. Therefore, 
mental quotation thus explained would not help to establish a substantially 
different account of phenomenal concepts. 
It might be contented that introspective attention is special in that it 
somehow quotes the thing being attended to as a component of thought, so it is 
very different from ordinary forms of attention (e.g perceptual attention). For 
example, some theorists (Balog Forthcoming) try to proceed along this line by 
conceiving introspective attention as some higher-order mental representation in 
the language of thought. However, such proposal is still too rough to be evaluated, 
and moreover, I can hardly see how a phenomenal feel can be a part of thought. 
As I take it, the puzzling nature of mental quotation is a major problem of the 
quotational account. However, even if the idea of mental quotation can be finally 
fleshed out, there are other serious problems. To mention two: 
First of all, if a phenomenal concept essentially incorporates a token of 
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phenomenal experience as its constituent, then concepts containing different token 
experiences are different concepts. However, given the limitation of human 
memory, the experience we have now would be notably different from what we 
can recall later. Therefore, we shall have different phenomenal concepts as time 
passes by. This strikes me as implausible. Suppose when Mary sees the ripe potato 
for the first time in her life, she thinks (to use Papineau's formulation of 
phenomenal concepts), "That kind of experience El is awesome", where El is the 
current reddish experience. Unfortunately, she is sent backed to her room again 
soon, and a few days later, she recalls the reddish experience, less vivid than the 
original experience, and thinks again, "That kind of experience E2 is awesome. I 
wish I could undergo it again.", where E2 is the recalled experience. Both 
thoughts involve the fundamental applications of phenomenal concepts, but one is 
based on current experience, the other on a faint memory of the experience. If the 
quotational account is correct, Mary is actually thinking about different 
phenomenal properties at these two occasions. Obviously, this is not true ofMary: 
she wants to undergo the same kind of experience again. 
It might be objected that Mary does deploy different concepts at these two 
occasions, but the two concepts refer to the same property nonetheless. That is, 
one may distinguish concept from the referent of concept, and maintain that Mary 
have two different concepts of the same property. However, this implies Mary 
entertains two substantively different thoughts ("That kind of experience El is 
awesome" and "That kind of experience E2 is awesome.，，）at the two occasions. 
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But this is unlikely. Moreover, it is natural to ask, how could concepts with 
different component token experience pick out the same property? 
This question leads toward the second general problem of the quotational 
account, namely, how can a token experience determine a type? This problem 
arises because, as Loar points out, phenomenal qualities or qualia have different 
degrees of generality, "and any phenomenal token will instantiate more than one 
quale." (Loar 2003: 119) Let's call this the generality problem. For example, the 
same reddish experience can be referred to as: "the quale of Red20 (a particular 
shade of red) experience", "reddish quale", "the quale of seeing a bright color" etc. 
Therefore, the individuation of phenomenal concepts (as conceived by the 
quotational account) needs more than the token experiences contained in the 
concepts. 
Some proponents of the quotational account are aware of problem. Their 
solution is to introduce the disposition to identify a set of phenomenal experiences 
that share an appropriate degree of similarity with the initial token contained in 
the concept. As Block puts it, the fact that a phenomenal concept can pick out one 
type of experience rather than another "depends on the subject's disposition to, for 
example, treat another experience as falling under the same concept." (Block 
2007: 283) Papineau also mentions "responsive disposition" that enables the 
subject to respond resembling instances in a uniform way. (Papineau 2002: 119). 
This appeal to disposition seems promising. In the meanwhile, however, it 
has made a great concession to the RD account, for, as is shown later in this 
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chapter (See2.2.2 and 2.2.3), what is essential to the explanation of phenomenal 
reference (e.g. how a phenomenal concept mange to refer to a phenomenal 
property) is the recognitional disposition, viz. the disposition to recognize 
instances as belonging to the same class. Therefore, this appeal to disposition 
faces the danger of collapsing into some form recognitional account. 
To sum up this section: I first suggest a major problem of the quotational 
account, namely, the obscurity of the notion of mental quotation. Although the 
obscurity itself does not amount to a knock down argument against the account, it 
does suggest it needs much more elaboration. Apart from this problem, I argue 
that the proposal faces two other difficulties: first, it seems to deny that we can 
think of the same kind experience as the relevant memory fades; second, to 
account for phenomenal reference (and also to solve the first problem), it has to 
move in a way that blurs the substantive difference from the RD account of 
phenomenal concepts. 
Perhaps all these difficulties can be resolved, and a quotational account of 
phenomenal concepts can be fleshed out, without collapsing into a special version 
of the RD account. This is certainly possible, though personally I see no reason to 
be so optimistic. However, there is an issue we should take seriously, namely, the 
putative virtue of quotational account over RD account: the explanation of the 
possession condition of phenomenal concepts. I will take up this issue in the 
second half of this chapter. To anticipate: I will argue the Loarian RD account can 
explain conceptual gap and the possession condition of phenomenal concepts, and 
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since Loarian RD account does not face similar problems that troubles the 
quotational account, it is a more favorable account of phenomenal concepts. 
2.2 The Recognitional/Demonstrative Account ofPhenomenal Concepts 
In this section, I will present another major account of phenomenal concepts, the 
recognitionaI/demonstrative account (I will call it "RD account" hereafter), and 
explain what I take to be the strongest version of it, the Loarian recognitional 
account, and consider some important objections in the end. 
The RD account is first proposed by Brian Loar ( his work on the subject is 
also the locus classics of the phenomenal concept strategy) Followers of this 
account include John Perry and Janet Levin, among others (Perry 2001, Levin 
2007). However, as I will explain later (2.2.3), there is a complexity regarding 
Loar's proposal: some ofhis remarks, especially in his earlier works (Loar 1997, 
2003), may also be read in a way that supports the quotational account of 
phenomenal concepts. But generally, especially as suggested by his modified and 
clearer proposal (Loar 2007), he is more inclined toward the RD account (I will 
call his later view Loarian RD account). At any rate, it is not my purpose to 
record everything these theorists have said, but rather to draw from their writings 
a more or less unified line of thought that represents an important trend of the 
phenomenal concept strategy (PCS). 
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2.2.1 Type Demonstratives and Token Demonstratives 
According to the RD account, phenomenal concepts are recognitional concepts, 
and are also called type demonstratives, for they generally have the linguistic form 
"that kind ofthing”. 
However, we have to be careful at this point because in philosophy of 
language, demonstratives are generally regarded as a type of indexical that can be 
used to refer to different objects on different occasions or contexts. Typical 
examples of demonstratives include that, he, there, that fish, that tall tree (the first 
three are simple or pure demonstratives, and the last two are complex 
demonstratives, which includes a noun phrase) (Kaplan 1989; Braun 2006). 
Roughly put, the reference of pure or simple demonstratives depend on the 
speaker's action (demonstration) and intention. The semantics of complex 
demonstratives are more controversial: in particular, it has been hotly debated 
what the semantic role of the common noun phrase (e.g. fish, tall tree) is. For our 
purposes, however, we do not need to get into these complexities so as to have a 
sense of the difference between demonstratives as usually conceived and type 
demonstratives: the former refer to particular objects in certain contexts and the 
later refer to types or kinds of objects. To highlight the difference, we may call the 
former token demonstratives. 
Correspondingly, we can distinguish a type phenomenal concept from a 
token phenomenal concept: a token phenomenal concept is a token demonstrative, 
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such as "that particular feeling", or simply "that", which picks out an instance of 
phenomenal experience, by introspectively attending and ostending to a current 
experience. Although token phenomenal concepts are useful sometimes, it is the 
type phenomenal concepts that are discussed in the physicalist-anitphysicalist 
debate, as the debate is about physical properties and phenomenal properties, 
rather than particular phenomenal experiences. 
It might be contended that type demonstratives are not genuine 
demonstratives, although they have similar linguistic forms (e.g. "that..."). Indeed, 
I prefer to use recognitional concepts rather than type demonstratives, as the 
undiscriminating use of the term "demonstratives" may leads one astray and 
misunderstand the RD account (See 2.2.8). In any case, however, the issue is 
largely terminological. What matters is the type-token distinction itself rather that 
how each kind of concepts is called. 
Underlying this distinction about what they refer, there is a more important 
distinction about how they refer. To simplify the issue, let us focus on pure 
demonstrative concept and recognitional concept. As noted above, a pure 
demonstrative "that" (typically at least) fixes its referent via the speaker's 
demonstration (a pointing gesture, for example) and intention, and the referent is 
the object demonstrated in the context. On the other hand, there is no way to 
literally "point" to a type一we can only point to an instance of that type. Rather, a 
recognitional concept fixes its referent on the basis of what may be called the 
recognitional disposition, i.e. the speaker's disposition to recognize and 
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(re)identify things as belonging to the same kind, to discriminate one kind of 
things from another kind, etc. That is, a recognitional concept refers to a type of 
things that the speaker is disposed to respond to in a similar way, and to classify 
them as members ofthe same set. 
I will say more about recognitional disposition in the next section (2.2.2), 
but before closing this section, I shall note that there is also another kind of 
concept that can be applied to refer to types, but is nonetheless different from 
recognitional concepts. Suppose the tree that I point to is actually an elm, but I 
cannot distinguish it from an oak, nor do I even know the name "elm", still, I can 
refer to elm by using "the species oftree that this one belongs". Here I am relying, 
not on my recognitional capacity, but on the scientific taxonomy of my 
community. Therefore, it is not a recognitional concept, but rather the 
combination of the demonstrative this, which serves to pin down an instance, and 
a descriptive component, the species ofthat...belongs. It is the descriptive part 
that enables the concept to refer to a kind, and thus I will call it descriptive type 
concept. 
2.2.2 The Perspectival Nature of Recognitional Concepts 
To consider recognitional concepts in more detail, it might be helpful to start with 
an example given by Loar. It is an example of a typical recognitional concept, i.e. 
perceptual recognitional concept. Suppose you have never seen any tropical fish 
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before, then: 
...in an aquarium you quickly identify a type of tropical fish, with a striking 
fantaiI and iridescent colors, confident that were another to appear right then 
from behind that undulating seaweed you would be able to identify it as of the 
same type. Your identifying prowess—however ephemeral it may be~enables 
you tojudge 'that sort offish'.(Loar 2003: 117-118) 
The identifying prowess is more or less identical to what I call recognition 
disposition. Loar's example illustrates at least three points worth noting: first, the 
application of a recognitional concept is grounded on or determined by a 
corresponding recognitional disposition; second, the recognitional disposition 
underlying your perceptual recognitional concept (PRC) depends on the way the 
objects appear to you ("fantail and iridescent colors"). That is, you identify and 
recognize objects on the basis of their appearance; third, to form perceptual 
recognitional disposition of a certain type of objects, one has to have perceived at 
least an instance of that type. 
The first point, which is about how recognitional concepts work, has already 
been introduced in the end of last section. The third point is about the possession 
condition of recognitional concepts. I will say more about them in section 2.2.3 
and 2.2.4. For now, I will focus on the second point, about the perspectival nature 
of recognitional concepts. 
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Suppose you now have the concept THAT KIND OF FISH. You know how 
the fish appear, and is able recognize and classify them as a kind. It is possible 
that your perception is inadequate, that fails to represent the tropical fish correctly 
in the details, but this defect of perception would not prevent you from acquiring 
a genuine PRC of a kind of fish. The things that matter here are what you see and 
what you are able to recognize, and you see and recognize things from your own 
perspective. I hope it is now clear that, the key to recognitional disposition is the 
first-personal point of view. In other words, recognitional concepts are 
perspectival, in that the subject's own perspective is constitutive to her 
recognitional concepts. 
It is tempting to explain the conceptual gap between phenomenal concepts 
and physical concepts by the perspectival nature of recognitional concepts.'^ For 
instance, one may explain the conceptual gap in terms of the contrast between 
first personal perspective (of phenomenal concepts) and third personal, objective 
perspective (of physical concepts). To be more precise and informative, one may 
appeal to the contrast in conceptual roles: the primary role of the recognitional 
concepts (including phenomenal concepts) is to enable one to recognize instances 
of a certain kind on basis of the way they appear to her, while that of the 
theoretical concepts is to analyze the relevant property in physical-functional 
terms, which are objective or third-personal. For instance, there may be PRC of 
oak and a corresponding theoretical concept (in biological terms), but the two 
18 This approach is characteristic of some advocates o f R D account. See Perry (2001) 
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concepts are independent of each other, because the recognitional capacity is 
independent of scientific analysis. In other words, the recognitional concept of 
oak is not inferable from the biological concept of oak, and vice versa. The 
conceptual gap between phenomenal and physical concepts can be explained in a 
similar fashion, although phenomenal concepts are different from perceptual 
recognitional concepts. (See 2.2.6) 
This line of thought is interesting and important; however, I don't think it 
fully captures the "explanatory gap" in Levine's sense. For one thing, as is noted 
earlier (1.2.4), the failure of derivation does not necessarily mean the existence of 
an explanatory gap; for another, there are cases where a recognitional concept and 
a theoretical concept co-refer, but we don't fmd it as puzzling as the 
phenomenal-physical identity. For instance, one may have a recognitional concept 
of circle (THAT KIND OF SHAPE) before she learns a geometrical concept of it 
(A CLOSED PLANE CURVE, EVERY POINT OF WHICH IS EUIDISTANT 
FROM A FIXED POINT WITHIN THE CURVE) in a geometry class. However, 
she would not be puzzled by what is learned in the class, i.e. that kind of shape is 
a closed plane curve every point of which is equidistant from a fixed point within 
the curve. For this identity, the explanatory gap problem does not arise. 
Therefore, although the perspectiveness is an important feature of 
phenomenal concepts, it alone cannot provide an adequate account of the gap 
between phenomenal and physical concepts. I will offer an explanation of the gap 
in the next chapter, especially 3.2. 
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2.2.3 Recognition, Memory, and Imagination 
In this section, I will discuss what the acquisition of recognitional disposition 
does and does not require. 
First, to have recognitional disposition about certain objects, one need to have 
memory of (the appearance o f ) that kind ofobjects. 
This assumption seems (to me at least) uncontroversial, for if one doesn't 
have any memory of the kind of objects at all, how could she recognize a 
particular object as "one of that kind"? 
Memory is necessary for recognition because it encodes the information of a 
type of objects that provides one with the guidance for recognition and 
classification. In this sense, the memory of the type serves as the mode of 
presentation of the corresponding recognitional concept. 
The mode of presentation in this sense is not what it is usually taken to be 
(something like Fregean sense or descriptive condition), as Loar makes it quite 
explicit in Loar 2003. According to Loar, the mode of presentation of the 
perceptual recognitional concept, THAT KIND OF FISH, is "a particular viewing 
of such a fish, or the visual memory of such a viewing, or a vague memory of 
such viewings, or failing even that, the feeling that one will know when one sees 
it" (Loar 2003: 118) This is what he calls "a psychological-epistemic factor" 
(Loar 2003: 118) involved in conceiving the fish. 
I find both truth and falsity in this characterization. I agree that there is some 
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psychological-epistemic factor serves as the mode of presentation, but in his 2003， 
Loar holds that a recognitional concept has a token mode of presentation, and the 
token is a particular experience of that fish ("a particular view of such a fish’，). 
This view is quite similar to the basic ideas of the quotational account. Later he 
renounced this view (Loar 2007), for the similar reason he rejects the quotational 
account: the generality problem. To repeat, a particular fish instantiates different 
properties, or can be an instance of different types of fish (blue fish, big fish, or 
strange-looking fish.etc), thus the token experience itself cannot determine which 
kind the recognitional concept refers to. According to his more recent view, 
recognitional concepts have type mode of presentation, which, in its essence, 
amounts to the memory of the type. 
Second, it is possible to have different recognitional dispositions of the 
same kind of things. 
The first thesis stresses the importance of memory in recognition, but it 
leaves open the manner in which things are memorized. The primary function of 
memory is to store information about things, but it is possible to accumulate 
different kinds of information about the same entity. Correspondingly, the 
recognitional disposition would be different. 
For example, humans generally classify red things by the color they appear 
to have, but there might be creatures, who lack the visual experience like ours, 
can nevertheless classify red things by the feeling of heat caused by the light 
reflected from the red surfaces. That is, there may be creatures extremely sensitive 
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to light, but instead of representing red objects as red, they represent them as 
displaying a particular degree of warmness. Moreover, for them, different colors 
would display different temperature, and thus they are able to classify and 
recognize red on basis of heat-sensational information, instead of visual 
information. Therefore, these creatures have heat-based, rather than color based, 
recognitional concept of red things. The possession of such concepts does not 
require scientific analysis of the temperature in question, but only the (extremely 
subtle) heat sensation. As a matter of fact, we humans have such heat-based 
recognitional capacities, and it is just that the heat sensation of these creatures are 
so fine-grained that they are able to classify and recognize objects of different 
color as well as we do so on basis of visual experience. 
So far I have argued for the possibility of recognitional concepts of red 
entities that bases on recognitional disposition of heat, but not redness itself. The 
lesson is that visual experience is not necessary for classify and recognize color. It 
is also possible to have recognitional disposition that does not depend on any kind 
ofphenomenal experience. This is what I will call the non-experiential disposition, 
or blank disposition. 
Take, for example, the case ofblindsight. Blindsight is a phenomenon caused 
by certain kinds of brain damage: although the patient is blind in some regions of 
visual field and lacks corresponding phenomenal experience, she can somehow 
guess to a high degree of correctness ( especially about the location, movement of 
objects) when prompted, as if she can see them. It appears as if the thoughts 
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somehow "pop into" her head, and thus she is able to make correct guesses. Now 
suppose there are also the cases of super-blindsighf. although super-blindsighter is 
still phenomenally blind, the subject can recognize spontaneously (in other words, 
her recognition is self-directed rather prompted) different objects as belonging to 
the same class, and bring them under a concept, e.g. THAT KIND OF THING. 
i9whatever kind of information is at work for (super)blindsighters to "see" and 
recognize things, it seems clear that, the information is non-experiential. 
This example concludes my defense of the second thesis. 
Third, to have memory of something, one need not be able to imagine or 
recreate it. 
Memory of something is always accompanied with the capacity to imagine 
or recreate the image of it, but it is not necessarily so. It is not unusual that 
although I can recognize a particular kind of thing accurately, the best I can 
imagine, when they are not present, is only a vague image that cannot capture the 
difference between that kind and others. Moreover, perhaps I cannot imagine any 
image at all, but only have the impression "I will know that when I see it again." 
Still, I may be able to classify them as those who are much better at imagination. 
Therefore, the capacity of recognition is independent of the capacity of 
imagination. 
2.2.4 The Possession Condition of Recognitional Concepts 
19 The example ofsuper-blindsight is from Ned Block (1995). 
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As pointed out in the last section, memory is necessary for recognitional concepts. 
This, together with another premise, will explain the possession condition of our 
recognitional concepts. That premise is: generally, we have memory about the 
appearances of things only if we have casual contact with their appearances. 
I use "causal contact" in a very loose way: it can be either perceptual or 
non-perceptual (as for some possible blindsight concepts). But the message is 
clear: one has to in some way directly in contact with to the appearance in order to 
acquire the information about that appearance. The possibility this premise rules 
out is the possibility that such information is innate. 
For example, to have a perpetual recognitional concept of some kind of fish, 
one needs to have actually seen what that fish looks like. But this does not entail 
that she has to see the fish itself, for the concern here is rather the appearance of 
fish, and thus it would equally do if she has seen a photo of that kind of fish. 
However, the case of phenomenal concepts is radically different in this respect, as 
we will see in the coming section. 
2.2.5 PRC and PC 
So far I have explained the difference between type demonstratives and token 
demonstratives; the perspectival nature of recognitional concepts; the relation 
between recognitional disposition, memory and capacity of imagination, as well 
as the possession condition of recognitional concepts. These points apply to all 
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kinds ofrecognitional concepts, including perceptual recognitional concepts (PRC) 
and phenomenal concepts (PC). However, there is an important difference 
between PRC and PC, to which I now tum to. 
As noted earlier, the mode of presentation of PRC is the memory of the 
appearance of the kind of objects in questions. To use Loar's example again, the 
mode of presentation ofTHAT KIND OF FISH, is the memory ofthe color, shape, 
and other visual properties of the tropical fish. It is also possible to acquire 
exactly the same concept without having actually seen any particular fish of that 
kind: for example, suppose you take the photo of the fish and show the photo to 
me, then I could have that concept just as you do. This is because when I acquire 
a PRC of the tropical fish, it is the appearance that I grasp and store in memory 
(and later on, I recognize the same kind of fish on basis oftheir appearance), and I 
classify the fish by their appearance. The photo thus is sufficient for me to do so. 
But in the case of phenomenal states, there is no such distance between 
appearance and reality. In other words, what a phenomenal state appears to be 
what it is. For example, when I appear to experience pain, I must be experiencing 
pain at the moment. Our grasp of the external objects (e.g. tropical fish) is 
mediated by our perceptual experiences of them, and the experiences (the 
psychological-epistemic factor) serve as the mode of presentation of our PRC of 
them; however, through introspection, I manage to grasp the phenomenal 
properties without the mediation of any other psychological-epistemic factor 
distinct from the objects being introspected. The information stored in my 
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memory ofphenomenal states is experiential or phenomenal information. 
Let's slow down a bit this point. Consider, again, the PRC in Loar's example, 
THAT KIND OF FISH. You become aware of the appearance of the tropical fish 
through conscious visual experience. You attend to the fish and form the concept, 
THAT KIND OF FISH. The information stored in memory is perceptual (visual, 
in particular): it is about the appearance of the fish. It is this visual information 
that distinguishes your concept of the fish from, say, heat-sensation based concept 
or the blindsight concept as discussed in 2.2.3. 
On the other hand, the underlying information of phenomenal concepts is 
phenomenal. This, basically, could be understood along the same line as the case 
of PRC: just as perceptual information consists in the way external things appear 
to the subject, phenomenal information consists in the way experiences appear to 
the subject. However, since the appearance of a phenomenal experience and the 
phenomenal experience itself are one and the same, it follows that phenomenal 
information consists in the phenomenal experiences themselves. Phenomenal 
memory (memory of certain phenomenal property) stores the phenomenal 
information, and thus the phenomenal property itself. To put it metaphorically, the 
memory is like a faint copy or scheme of our original experience. 
Some may complain that my distinction between perceptual information 
and phenomenal information is defeated the transparency of experience. Suppose 
you are having an experience of red round patch on the wall, and tum your 
attention to the experience itself. The introspection will reveal nothing beyond the 
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redness and roundness of the patch, and in particular, nothing intrinsic to the 
experience in the way redness and roundness are intrinsic to the patch. Experience 
is transparent, so to speak. Therefore, there is no phenomenal information as 
opposed to perceptual information. 
The transparency of experience is a controversial issue in contemporary 
philosophy of mind.^ ® But I think my points here are immune to the controversy. 
All I am claiming are, first, there is no difference between an experience and its 
appearance that parallels the difference between an external object and its 
appearance; second, through introspection, we can grasp phenomenal experience 
(in a way we cannot do to external objects) as it is, store the phenomenal 
information in memory to form recognitional concepts of the phenomenal 
experiences themselves. 
I believe it is the special mode of memory that motives Loar to claim that 
phenomenal experience serves as its own mode of presentation, or, that 
phenomenal concepts have non-contingent mode of presentation. In contrast, 
perceptual recognitional concepts (PRC) have contingent mode ofpresentation, 
for the perceptual appearance of external objects are different from the objects 
themselves. 
The clarifications above, I hope, can help to explain the possession 
condition of phenomenal concepts: since we do not have innate phenomenal 
information, we need causal contact with the phenomenal experience and know 
20 For more on the transparency of experience, see Tye (2000) 
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what it appears, that is to say (as the appearance of an experience is identical with 
the experience itself), we have to actually undergo the experience itself. 
2.2.6 Compare the Quotational Account and the Loarian Recognitional 
Account 
Careful readers may have noticed that the Loarian account of phenomenal 
concepts that I am elaborating here is similar in several important aspects to the 
quotational account explained in the first half of this chapter. In particular, both 
assign a constitutive role to the phenomenal experience: according to the 
quotational account, a phenomenal concept mentally quotes a phenomenal 
experience to refer to that experience; and according to the Loarian recognitional 
account, the phenomenal property stored in memory serves as the ground for the 
recognitional disposition. 
However, there are at least two crucial differences that suggest strong 
reasons to prefer the Loarian recognitional account to the quotational account. 
First, a phenomenal concept, as construed by the quotational account, 
incorporates an instance of phenomenal experience, or, a phenomenal token. On 
the other hand, the memory underlies any recognitional disposition is a memory 
oftypes rather than tokens. Therefore, for the Loarian recognitional account, it is 
the memory of phenomenal types or properties that enables one to identify 
different phenomenal tokens as ofthe same kind. So this account will not face the 
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generality problem as noted in 2.1.4. 
Second, the sense of constitution that involved in the Loarian recognitional 
account is much less mysterious than mental quotation in the quotational account. 
This is because in the Loarian recognitional account, the phenomenal property is 
constitutive in that it is stored in the memory that grounds the recognitional 
disposition. In this sense of constitution, perceptual information is constitutive to 
our perceptual recognitional concept (PRC) as well. Therefore, this sense of 
constitution is not unique; rather, it is common to our recognitional concepts. 
Of course, there is something special about phenomenal concepts: the 
information stored in the memory underlying phenomenal concepts are 
themselves are identical to the phenomenal properties that the concepts pick out. 
In contrast, the relevant information o fRCP is perceptual information, such as the 
color, shape, etc, which represent the external objects perceptually, but are not the 
external objects themselves. But this has nothing to do with the way in which 
phenomenal concepts are constituted, but rather, it is about what constitute 
phenomenal concepts in that way, namely, the phenomenal properties themselves. 
As I will argue in Chapter 3，the way we grasp phenomenal properties via 
introspection (I will call it "phenomenal acquaintance") is central for the 
explanation of the explanatory gap and thus PCS's defense of physicalism. 
However, this is the topic of next chapter, and for now I will leave it aside and 
turn to Balog's complaint about the recognitional account. 
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2.2.7 Reply to Balog's Complaint 
I think now it is clear how the Loarian recognitional account can reply to Balog's 
complaint (2.1.3). To recapitulate it: if a recognitional concept pick out a 
particular phenomenal state solely in virtue of causal-recognitional relation, then 
the concept and the phenomenal state are independent existences, for a cause and 
its consequences are distinct. It is then possible to have a recognitional concept of 
a phenomenal property without having actual connection with it. However, this is 
in conflict with the possession condition of phenomenal concepts: to have a 
phenomenal concept of a certain phenomenal property, we must have undergone 
at least an instance of that property. 
I agree that there could be recognitional concepts of pain without actually 
experiencing pain, but I deny that there could be phenomenal concepts of pain 
without actually experiencing pain. Therefore, there is no conflict between the 
Loarian recognitional account of phenomenal concepts and the possession 
condition requirement. 
To elaborate: according to the Loarian account, phenomenal concept is a 
special kind of recognitional concept. It is special in that the memory of 
phenomenal information that underlies the recognitional disposition, and that the 
phenomenal information is the same of the phenomenal property referred to by 
the phenomenal concept. In Loar's word, phenomenal property serves as its own 
mode of presentation. In still other words, we may say that phenomenal concepts 
have phenomenal mode of presentation. Therefore, there exists a special intimate 
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link between a phenomenal concept and the phenomenal property that it refers to, 
and since we do not have innate phenomenal information, we must acquire it 
through actual experience. Therefore, to form a phenomenal concept we must 
have the phenomenal information, and to have that memory we must have 
undergone at least an instance of phenomenal property. This is exactly the 
possession condition of phenomenal concepts. 
One may ask, is there any recognitional concept of a phenomenal state, e.g. 
pain, other than the kind of phenomenal concept I have suggested? Yes. Recall 
that, in 2.2.3, I used the example of super-blindsight concepts of external objects 
to show that it is possible to have different recognitional dispositions of the same 
kind of things. In the same vein, we can imagine super-blindsight concepts of 
experience. That is, although the super-blindsighter does undergo various 
experiences, the experiencesjust come and go, and she does not have phenomenal 
information kept in her memory. However, like the super-blindsighter of external 
objects, she somehow acquires non-phenomenal information (whatever that is) 
stored in memory that enables her to distinguish, classify and identify different 
phenomenal experiences. In this case, she would have non-phenomenal 
recognitional concepts of phenomenal properties.^' 
21 According to Janet Levin (Levin 2007)，the difference between phenomenal concepts and 
blindsight concepts that pick out an inner state lies in the difference in what these concepts refer. 
The very possibility of non-phenomenal recognitional concept of phenomenal properties falsifies 
this claim: for a recognitional concept, besides what it refers, how (e.g. what kind ofmemoty the 
recognitional disposition is grounded on) it refers matters too. 
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2.3 Objections and Replies 
In this section, I will consider two objections to the Loarian Recognitional 
account of phenomenal concepts that I defended earlier, and along the way, will 
clarify the account against some possible misunderstandings. 
2.3.1 Chalmers，Objection 
David Chalmers, as a proponent of the quotational account of phenomenal 
concepts on the dualist side, has an interesting objection against the RD account. 
While agreeing that there are demonstrative phenomenal concepts, he contends 
that this is not the whole story, for there are more substantive phenomenal 
concepts, which he calls "pure phenomenal concepts", that Mary learns after 
leaving her black-white room. 
According to Chalmers, pure phenomenal concepts pick out their referents not 
by causal or relational descriptions (e.g. "The kind of phenomenal quality caused 
by seeing paradigmatic red things"), nor by introspective ostending (e.g. "That 
phenomenal quality I am undergoing now"). Consider the scenario of Mary. 
Suppose she looks at red things for the first time, and is, simultaneously, 
introspecting her experience. Now she thinks, “That experience I am having now 
is such-and-such." The term "that experience" picks out the current experience 
through mental or introspective demonstration. Later, when she sees something 
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blue, she engages the thought, “That experience is such-and-such. It is different 
from the reddish experience." while demonstrating the bluish experience. In both 
situations, the same demonstrative concept ("That experience") is applied, but the 
relevant experiences are different. That is to say, the "such-and-such" are 
different. 
The concept having the form of "such-and-such" is what Chalmers has in 
mind when he talks about pure phenomenal concepts. Pure phenomenal concepts 
are special in that they "characterize... the phenomenal quality as the phenomenal 
quality it is." (Chalmers 2003: 226) That is to say, a phenomenal concept 
represents a phenomenal property as itself, i.e. as phenomenal property, not as the 
satisfiers of some descriptive conditions, or as the objects of introspective 
demonstration. 
Now let Mary's demonstrative phenomenal concept of her current reddish 
experience be E, and the corresponding pure phenomenal concept being R. 
Chalmers argues that, since a demonstrative phenomenal concept is just a matter 
of introspective demonstration, and no a priori reasoning can rule out the 
possibility that Mary is demonstrating a different quality (for example, the quality 
of bluish experience), her thought E=R is cognitively significant, in that it 
"involves attributing a certain substantive quality nature to a type that is identified 
demonstratively." (Chalmers 2003:203)Therefore, demonstrative concepts of 
phenomenal properties are different from pure phenomenal concepts. 
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Reply: Advocates of RD account can reply that Chalmers’ argument has missed 
the point because he confuses token phenomenal concept with type phenomenal 
concept. Recall that, a token phenomenal concept, by introspective demonstration, 
picks out an instance of phenomenal experience, but to acquire a type phenomenal 
concept, a proper recognitional disposition is required (2.2.1). 
Chalmers’ argument is compelling only i f E is a token demonstrative concept. 
In fact, the analogies he uses to show the cognitive significance of E=R are based 
exclusively on token demonstratives concepts: 
Mary's belief E = R is as cognitively significant as any other belief in which 
the object of a demonstrative is independently characterized: e.g. my belief I 
am David Chalmers, or my belief that object is tall. For Mary, E = R is not a 
priori. No a priori reasoning can rule out the hypothesis that she is now 
ostending some other quality entirely, just as no a prioH reasoning can rule 
out the hypothesis that I am David Hume, or that the object I am pointing to 
is short. (Chalmers 2003: 225-226) 
Token demonstratives such as "1", "that object" pick out their referents by the 
speakers' act of demonstration (or intention, in some cases); similarly, token 
phenomenal concepts pick out particular phenomenal experiences by speakers' act 
of mental or introspective demonstration. Token demonstratives can pick out 
different entities in different contexts because the act of demonstration is 
independent of the objects of demonstration. Therefore, the possibility that "1" 
refers o David Hume cannot be ruled out a priori, and identities such as “I am 
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David Chalmers" are cognitively significant. 
However, this is irrelevant to the issues surrounding PCS, which is 
concerned about type phenomenal concepts that refer to phenomenal properties. 
Although sharing a similar linguistic form, token and type demonstrative concepts 
are very different. The reference of a type demonstrative or recognitional concept 
does not depend on a particular act of demonstration, but rather the underlying 
recognitional disposition.^^ Moreover, according to RD account, although a 
particular mental act of introspective demonstration can pick out different 
experiences in different contexts, the recognitional disposition underlying a 
particular phenomenal concept is constant. This is because a recognitional 
disposition is always grounded on the memory of a particular kind. 
Therefore, although Mary may use the same phrase "that kind of experience" 
to refer to both reddish and bluish experience，her concepts of the two are 
different, because the recognitional dispositions underlying the two concepts are 
different. 
2.3.2 Raffman 's Objection: 
Drawing on some psychological findings, Dianna Raffman argues that Loar's 
recognitional account of phenomenal concepts is false (Raffman 1995). Her 
22 But introspective demonstration does have a role in the formation of our phenomenal 
concepts. Only through introspective demonstration can we collect the phenomenal information, 
stored in memory, and form the appropriate recognitional disposition. In this way, introspective 
demonstrative does have a role in determining the reference. 
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reasoning has the following steps: first, it is an empirical fact that our capacity to 
discriminate color and sound outweighs our capacity to recognize them, for our 
memory of these relevant types is more coarse-grained than our perception. For 
example, confronted with some very specific shade of colors, say, Red30 and 
Red31, that differ from each other only minimally, we are able to discriminate 
them; however, we cannot re-identify or recognize Red30 when it is singled out 
later. In other words, the limitation of memory sets a constraint on our 
recognitional capacity. Second, correspondingly, our ability to recognize the 
phenomenal qualities of our experiences is limited: although we can discriminate 
Red30 experience from Red31 experience when both are occurring, we cannot 
recognize or re-identify them. Therefore, we do not have recognitional concepts 
of them. Third, since we do have concepts of those fine-grained phenomenal 
properties when they are instantiated, it follows that there are non-recognitional 
concepts that pick out phenomenal properties. Therefore, the RD account of 
phenomenal concepts is inadequate. Not all phenomenal concepts are 
recognitional. 
Reply: Loar and Levin have replied to this objection in a similar fashion (Loar 
2003，Levin 2007). I find their reply convincing and will just summarize it in 
what follows. 
First of all, they acknowledge that there may be phenomenal qualities that 
can we can discriminate but cannot recognize later. However, they deny that we 
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have phenomenal concepts of them. This is because phenomenal concepts are first 
personal, introspective concepts that refer to phenomenal properties. Of those 
fine-grained phenomenal experiences, they contend, we can only have token 
phenomenal concepts that pick out particular experiences. However, PCS is 
concerned about phenomenal concepts that refer to phenomenal properties, so 
token phenomenal concepts are irrelevant.^^ 
But the fact that we do not have phenomenal concepts of some fine-grained 
phenomenal qualities is not a problem for PCS. PCS is a response to the 
explanatory gap problem, but the problem, which is about phenomenal properties, 
can only be formulated with phenomenal concepts (consider, for example, Mary's 
new knowledge). In other words, the explanatory gap problem arises only with 
regard to the phenomenal properties that we do have phenomenal concepts of. 
Therefore, PCS, as a response to the explanatory gap problem, does not require 
that we have phenomenal concepts of all the phenomenal properties instantiated 
in us. 
23 Although Loar and Levin have not mention this, it seems to me that we can also have some 
descriptive type concepts of the fine-grained phenomenal qualities, such as THE PHENOMENAL 
QUALITIES OF SEEING RED30. However, the fact that this concept picks out the phenomenal 
quality of seeing Red30 rather than the quality o f s e e Red31 is due to the scientific specification of 
the color (based on non-experiential features, such as wave length or frequency). Therefore, this 
concept is not ^phenomenal concept, which, by definition, is first personal and is acquired via 
introspection. 
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Chapter 3 The Phenomenal Concept Strategy Examined 
3.1 The Phenomenal Concept Strategy: A BriefReview 
The primary focus of Chapter 3 is PCS and its role in the physicalistAlualist 
dialectics. In this section, I will briefly review some of the issues covered in 
Chapter 1，and set the ground for further discussion. 
Let us begin with the formulation of physicalism. Suppose P is the summary 
of complete physical truths of the actual world, and P* is the summary of the 
truths of phenomenal experiences. Recall that, according to supervenience 
physicalism^^, for any world where P is true, then necessarily P* is true in that 
world. In other words, P*depends on P. Following Stoljar, we can interpret this 
idea in terms of the psychophysical conditional: 
(1) IfPthen P* (Stoljar 2005:472) 
According to most physicalists, (1) is a necessary a posteriori truth. PCS 
explains the a posteriori status of (1) in terms of the conceptual gap between 
phenomenal concepts and physical concepts. Recall that, PCS consists of two 
major doctrines. 
D1: Physicalism is true a posteriori 
24 I use supervenience physicalism rather than identity physicalism because this is the way 
how Stoljar formulates his objection to PCS. However, it is not difficult to see that his objection 
and my response can be put in terms ofidentity physicalism. 
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D2: The explanatory gap between physical truths (P) and phenomenal truths 
(P*) arises from the conceptual gap between physical concepts and phenomenal 
concepts. 
D3: The conceptual gap can be accounted in a way that is compatible with 
physicalism. 
Since PCS aims to account for the explanatory gap (or the dualistic intuition) 
in a way that is compatible with physicalism, any proponent of PCS needs to 
answer two questions: first, what is the nature of the conceptual gap? Second, 
how to account for the conceptual gap is compatible with physicalism? 
In what follows, I will address these questions via the examination of two 
objections to PCS. The first objection, due to Daniel Stoljar, concerns D2, and the 
second, due to David Chalmers, concerns D3. PCS is a complicated and easily 
misunderstood strategy. As I see it, both objections are based on, in one way or 
another, misunderstandings of some key commitments of PCS. A careful 
examination of these objections thus will help to clarify and elaborate PCS's key 
commitments and its answers to the above two questions. 
In Chapter 2, I reviewed two major accounts of phenomenal concepts and 
defend the Loarian recognitional account. However, all points about PCS that I 
am going to say are (or could be) shared by versions of PCS that adopt the 
quotational account of phenomenal concepts, so nothing hangs particularly on the 
version that I favor. Both objections are supposed to be objections to PCS in 
general, and hence, in responding to them, it is crucial to keep things at a more or 
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less general level and exploit resources available to different versions ofPCS 
3.2 Stoljar's Objections 
The first part of this chapter is devoted to the examination of Daniel Stoljar's 
objections (Stoljar, 2005). He raises two reductio ad absurdum arguments against 
PCS, and I'll refute them in turn.^^ His arguments are similar in two respects: 
First, both target at a central tenet of PCS, namely, that the conceptual gap 
between phenomenal and physical concepts could explain the a posteriori status 
of ( l ) . Hence, if Stoljar's arguments are sound, PCS is doomed to fail. 
Second, they have similar structures, which can be put as following: first, 
PCS appeals to a property K to differentiate phenomenal concepts from physical 
concepts, and to account for the a posteriori status of (1); second, if PCS is 
correct, conditionals that parallel (1) (i.e. involving two concepts, one of which 
has K but the other doesn't) would be a posteriori too; third, since some of those 
conditionals are in fact a priori, K alone cannot ensure the a posteriority. 
Therefore, PCS fails. 
Clearly, these are serious objections. But before examining his arguments 
25 In fact, Stoljar has a third argument that targets at the general idea PCS deploys to disarm 
conceivability arguments. This argument is based on two premises: 1) The conceivability 
argument against behaviorism (Super-Spartan argument) is sound; 2) This argument is structurally 
similar to the conceivability argument against physicalism in general (Zombies argument). His 
argument is that, if PCS defuses the conceivability argument against physicalism, it will also 
defuse the conceivability argument against behaviorism. This consequence is implausible, because 
the later is sound. Since I think behaviorists have good response to the Super-Spartan argument, I 
deny the first premise. In any case, this argument is not of particular interest for our current 
concem ofPCS. 
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in detail, I will first introduce some terminology. 
3.2.1 Experience Thesis and the A priori/ A priori SynthesizabIe 
In this section, I will briefly explain the common basis of different proposals of 
PCS, as Stoljar conceives them,^^ and a crucial distinction for his first objection. 
Phenomenal concepts are first-personal concepts that refer to the 
phenomenal properties. In order to posses a phenomenal concept that refers to a 
particular phenomenal property，one has to undergo the experience with that 
property. This is the possession condition for phenomenal concepts, as noted in 
chapter 2. Both the quotational and the recognitional accounts agree on this fact 
about the possession condition, but they differ in how the fact should be explained. 
However, we can safely leave these details aside, since Stoljar constructs his 
argument solely on the basis of the commitments shared by all versions of PCS. 
He puts the point about possession condition for phenomenal concepts in what he 
calls the experience thesis. 
The Experience Thesis: S possesses the (phenomenal) concept C of experience 
E only if S has actually had experience E. (2005: 471) 
In his first objection, Stoljar argues that the experience thesis could not help 
26 Some o f the points in the following have already been mentioned in the last chapter. 
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PCS to justify the claim that the psychophysical conditional (1) is a posteriori. 
The key to his argument is the distinction between a priori and a priori 
synthesizable. To get a flavor of the distinction, consider two claims about the 
conditional "IfAthen B": 
(2) ‘If A then B, is such that a sufficiently logically acute person who 
possessed only the concepts required to understand it, is in position to know 
that it is true. 
(3) ‘If A then B, is such that a sufficiently logically acute person who 
possessed only the concepts required to understand its antecedent, is in a 
position to know that it is true. (Stoljar 2005: 478) 
If (2) is true, then the conditional ‘If A then B, is a priori; if (3) is true, the 
conditional is a priori synthesizable. For instance, "If x=y, then y=x" is a priori 
synthesizable, and, to use Stoljar's own example, the following statement is a 
priori but not a priori synthesizable: 
(4) If X is rectangular, then x has some property or another (Stoljar 2005: 
478) 
To understand the consequent of (4), one has to understand the concept 
PROPERTY beside the concept RECTANGULAR. In other words, a logically 
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acute person cannot derive, on a priori ground, the concept PROPERY from 
RECTANGULAR. Therefore, although (4) is true a priori, it does not follow that 
it is also true a priori synthesizable. 
The morals of these examples are twofold. First, if a conditional is a priori 
synthesizable, it is a priori: if one knows the truth of the conditional by 
understanding its antecedent, he is also in a position to know its truth by 
understanding the whole conditional. Second, the reverse entailment, however, 
does not hold, as suggested by the example above. 
3.2.3 The Immediacy Thesis and Phenomenal Acquaintance 
Now we are in position to tum to Stoljar's first objection. Stoljar thinks that PCS 
is committed toAl : , 
A1: The difference in the possession condition for concept explains the a 
posteriori status of (1). 
The idea is that, the possession of phenomenal concepts requires the occurrence 
of relevant experience. In other words, the experience thesis is true. The matter is 
quite different, however, with physical concepts. For example, to possess the 
concept NEURON, we do not need have experience of neuron. So whatever the 
possession condition for physical concepts is exactly, it seems that it is nothing 
like the experience thesis. For this reason, the possession of physical concepts 
does not ensure the possession of any phenomenal concept, and we cannot derive 
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p* (phenomenal truths) from P (physical truths) simply in virtue of knowing P. 
Therefore, (1) is a posteriori. 
Stoljar thinks this line of reasoning fails. This is because, according to Stoljar, 
A1 entails the following general rule: 
Con.l: For any conditional of the form "if x is A, then x is B", if concept A 
and B have different possession conditions, then it is a posteriori. 
Stoljar argues that Con.l is false. To see why, consider the following proposition: 
(5) l f x is a number, then it is not red. (2005: 479) 
Here the term "red" refers to the reddish experience. RED is the 
corresponding phenomenal concept. As the experience thesis suggests, in order to 
posses the concept RED one must have the reddish experience. The relevant 
experience is then also required for NOT RED. It is intuitively clear that the 
concept NUMBER does not have the possession condition required by the 
experience thesis. Therefore 
A2: NOT RED and NUMBER have different possession conditions 
It follows from C1 and A2 that: 
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Con.2: (5) is a posteriori. 
This conclusion is obviously false, because (5) is a priori. In Stoljar's view, 
the primary problem is Con.l. The difference in concept possession condition 
only ensures that the conditional is not a priori synthesizable, but does not thereby 
ensure that it is not a priori. According to the experience thesis, by having 
physical concepts alone, one does not thereby possess phenomenal concepts. That 
is, a logically acute person could understand P but without understanding P*, if 
she lacks the corresponding phenomenal experiences. Therefore, (1) is not a 
priori synthesizable. However, the fact that a conditional is a priori synthesizable 
does not entail that it is a priori (for example, the statement (4) is not a priori 
synthesizable but a priori). Furthermore, since Con.l is derived from Al，A1 is 
false too. Since Al is fundamental to PCS, PCS fails to explain the a posteriori 
status of (1). 
As I see it, an obvious problem of this argument is the alleged commitment 
to Al on the part of proponents of PCS. It is true that they all accept the 
experience thesis, and thus agree that phenomenal concepts and physical concepts 
have different possession conditions, but it does not follow that they rely on this 
difference to explain the a posteriori status of (1). 
Instead, I think the key to PCS is not how we come to possess phenomenal 
concepts, but is how we conceive phenomenal properties. This point can be put in 
terms of what I call the immediacy thesis. Suppose e is a phenomenal experience 
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token, 0 is the phenomenal property of e, and S is the person who undergoes e. 
The Immediacy Thesis: the cognitive relation between S and 0 is immediate, 
in the sense that when S introspectively attends to e, S can grasp 0 directly 
and substantially. 
The introspective way of conceiving phenomenal properties is sometimes called 
"acquaintance" in the literature (Balog forthcoming). To highlight the content of 
acquaintance, I'll call it phenomenal acquaintance'. 
Phenomenal acquaintance: S has phenomenal acquaintance with 0 in the 
sense that when S introspectively attends to e, S can grasp 0 in a 
cognitively immediate way (i.e. directly and substantially). 
Let me explain the "directness" and "substantiality" that constitutes the immediate 
cognitive relation. 
To say that our grasp of phenomenal properties is direct is to say that, when 
we conceive phenomenal properties via introspection, we need not rely on, or 
appeal to, other forms of representation so as to conceive them. In other words, 
the content of our introspection is not borrowed from other representational items. 
For instance, suppose there is a painting of a palace, you look at the house, and 
think, “That is gorgeous!" In this case, the content of your demonstration is 
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borrowed from the painting, which already has palace as its content. Therefore, 
your cognitive access to the palace is indirect. In contrast, when you attend to 
your own experience (say, e), your acquaintance with the phenomenal character of 
the experience (that is, 0 ) is not mediated by some further mental state that 
already has the phenomenal character (0) as its content. 
To say that our grasp of phenomenal properties is substantial is to say that, in 
a sense, through acquaintance, we are able to grasp the nature or essence of 
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phenomenal properties. If I reflect on my current pain, I am able to grasp the 
painfulness, which is all there is to experience pain. In contrast, when I see a 
space shuttle in front of me, I can think about it (^‘That looks funny"), but I may 
still wonder about its nature ("What is that, after all?") if I know nothing about 
space shuttle. 
For PCS, the importance of acquaintance lies in the fact that, due to the 
cognitive immediacy involved, phenomenal acquaintance alone tells us nothing 
about the possible casual-functional links between the phenomenal properties and 
other mental or physical-functional properties, or the possible causal-functional 
role the phenomenal properties play. Phenomenal acquaintance reveals no 
theoretical (especially physical-functional) information about the phenomenal 
properties. In other words, in introspection phenomenal properties are not 
represented as physical-functional properties. Since phenomenal concepts are 
27 The words "nature" and "essence" are loose. If physicalism is correct, then phenomenal 
property is physical, but phenomenal concepts reveals nothing about its physical nature. The point 
here is only that we are able to grasp all there is of what it's like to undergo a certain experience, 
instead of some respects of it. On this point, see McLaughlin 2001, Balog forthcoming. 
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acquired through introspection，they do not represent phenomenal properties as 
physical-functional properties either. For this reason, phenomenal concepts are 
conceptually isolated from the physical-functional concepts (and neuroscientific 
concepts, in particular). Therefore, phenomenal truths and physical truth are not 
connected a priori, and (1) is a posteriori. 
It is this conceptual isolation that gives rise to the explanatory gap problem. 
But this conceptual isolation or gap is compatible with the possibility that, in fact, 
phenomenal properties are physical-functional. In effect, proponents of PCS hold 
that the following two propositions are compatible: a) phenomenal properties are 
physical-functional properties; b) phenomenal concepts do not represent 
phenomenal properties as physical-functional properties. 
I hope it is now clear what Stoljar's first misunderstanding is: For PCS, it is 
not the difference in possession conditions for concepts, but difference in the 
nature of concepts (in particular, phenomenal concepts do not represent 
phenomenal properties as physical-functional) that explains the a posteriori 
29 status. 
28 More on this, see chapter 2. 
29 There is a variation of Stoljar's first argument: the Experienced Mary Argument. 
Experienced Mary is just like Mary except that she has the phenomenal experience and thus also 
the relevant phenomenal concepts. However, she suffers a partial amnesia that she cannot 
memorize the conceptual link between phenomenal concepts and corresponding physical concepts. 
For example, she may have the concept PAIN but forget that pain is c-fiber stimulation. Therefore, 
when she retums to the black-and-white room, she is still unable to infer from c-fiber stimulation 
to pain. According to Stoljar, PCS's response to the original knowledge argument or Mary 
argument is to point out that Mary possesses the physical without corresponding phenomenal 
concepts. However, Stoljar argues, this response is insufficient for the Experienced Mary . 
Argument, because Experienced Mary possesses both kinds of concepts. As I see it, however, this 
modified argument does not falsify PCS, instead, it makes Stoljar's misreading o f P C S even more 
apparent: PCS proponent does not appeal to the difference of concept possession condition to 
explain Mary's inability to infer from physical truth to phenomenal concept, rather, the problem 
lies in the nature of the concepts themselves, e.g, that phenomenal concept bears the cognitive 
immediacy, and cannot provide casual-functional information. It is precisely for this reason that 
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3.2.4 Conceptual Difference and Conceptual Gap 
At some places, Stoljar seems to anticipate the objection I have raised just now. 
He mentions an alternative proposal that does not rely on the experience thesis: 
Christopher Hill and Brian McLaughlin's version of PCS. They write (in their 
terminology, phenomenal concepts are called sensory concepts): 
The epistemic constraints that govem our use of sensory concepts are 
orthogonal to those that govern our use of physical concepts. When one uses a 
sensory concept to classify one's own current experiences, the experiences that 
guide and justify one in applying the concept are always identical with the 
experiences to which the concept is applied. Sensory states are self-presenting 
states: we experience them, but we do not have sensory experiences of them. 
We experience them simply by virtue of being in them. Sensory concepts are 
recognitional concepts: deploying such concepts, we can introspectively 
recognize when we are in sensory states simply by focusing our attention 
directly on them. Matters are of course quite different in the case of perceptual 
and theoretical concepts. An agent's access to the phenomena that he or she 
perceives is always indirect: it always occurs via an experience of the 
perceived phenomena that is not identical with the perceived phenomena but it 
Experienced Mary, even she understands PAIN, cannot derive PAIN from C-FIBER 
STIMULATION. In other words, the Experienced Mary does not falsify PCS; instead, PCS could 
explain the failure ofExperienced Mary to derive phenomenal truth from physical truth. 
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is rather caused by it. (Hill & McLaughlin 1999: 49-50) 
To put things in our terms, Hill & McLaughlin's point is that, phenomenal states 
are self-presenting: it is the same property that a) serves as the mode of 
presentation of a phenomenal concept; b) is what the concept applies to. In Loar's 
words, phenomenal properties serve as their own mode of presentation. Because 
of the self-presenting nature of phenomenal states, our cognitive access to them is 
immediate. On the other hand, our access to a physical state in indirect: it is 
accessed through a perceptual experience, usually caused by it, but different from 
it. 
This analysis of phenomenal concepts provides us with a more concrete 
articulation of the immediacy thesis. What I have called "cognitive immediacy" is 
here explained in terms of the self-presenting nature of phenomenal states. If 
Stoljar's objection is to dojustice to PCS, it is this line of thought, rather than the 
considerations based on the possession condition for phenomenal concepts, that 
should be taken seriously. 
So how does Stoljar reply? He contends that Hill and McLaughlin's proposal 
faces a similar problem: the difference in the nature of concepts does not entail 
the a posteriority of the relevant conditional. For the ease of exposition, I shall 
focus on Hill& McLaughlin,s account, and follow Stoljar in calling phenomenal 
1 
concepts "self-presenting concepts". 
Stoljar's argument can be formulated as follows: 
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A1': The difference in the nature of concepts (phenomenal concepts are 
self-presenting, but physical concepts are not) explains the a posteriori status of 
(1) 
A2': NUMBER is not a self-presenting concept, NOT RED is a self-presenting 
concept. 
Con.l，： For any conditional of the form "If x is A, then x is B", if the concept 
of A is self-representing, but B is not, then the conditional is a posteriori. ( A1' 
generalized) 
Con.2': (5) is a posteriori. (Con.l', A2') 
Again, since Con.2' is false and A2' is true, Stoljar's concludes that Con.l ' is false: 
the difference in the nature concepts does not ensure the a posteriori status of 
relevant conditionals. Con.l ' is a generalization of A1', and hence, A1, is false, 
and PCS fails to explain the a posteriori status of (1) 
In objection to A2，，defenders of PCS may either deny that the negation of a 
self-presenting concept is also a self-presenting concept, or maintain that 
physicalism, as formulated in (1), is only about positive truth�。，and since Stoljar's 
argument appeals to a negative property, the argument is irrelevant to physicalism. 
However, I think neither of these objections work, because we may also have: 
30 A positive truth about a property says a property is instantiated. For example, "The house is 
big." 
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A3’： NUMBER is not self-presenting concept, RED is a self-presenting 
concept. 
(6): If X is a number, then x is red. 
Still, if Con.l, is correct, (6) would be a posteriori (though false). Therefore, the 
same problem can be raised againstAl' . 
1 agree with Stoljar that Con.l，is problematic, but deny that A1' is thereby 
false. This is because Con.l’ does not follow from A1'. The reason is that the term 
"difference" in A1' is ambiguous: the conceptual difference can be either 
"shallow" or "deep". I shall put this point in terms of conceptual difference and 
conceptual gap. 
For any two concepts, U and V.: 
1. There is a conceptual difference between U and V iff U has a certain feature 
FthatVlacks^' . 
2. There is a conceptual gap between them iff there is no a priori link between 
U and V，in the sense that it is cannot be determined a priori if U and V 
co-refer. 
Obviously, conceptual gap entails conceptual difference: if there is no conceptual 
difference between U and V, then U is identical with V a priori. But the reverse 
1 
31 What concerns us here is the distinction between "conceptual difference" and "conceptual 
gap". The distinction is intuitively clear even without a detailed characterization o fF . As I see, F 
can either be trivial (BACHELOR and UNMARRIED MAN) or significant (THE MORNING 
STAR and THE EVENING STAR). 
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does not hold. Take, for example, the concepts ofSQUARE and QUADRILATER. 
Presumably, the definition of square involves the description "...has 4 equal 
sides，，while that of quadrilateral does not, but there are other features, such as 
“".has 4 sides, 4 angles" that both share, and from these common features we can 
know a prior that if something is a square, then it is a quadrilateral. To 
generalize, there might be conceptual difference but no conceptual gap between U 
and V，because there might be features other than F that links U and V a priori. 
Moreover, a priori link can be negative, in the sense that it is a priori that U and 
V cannot co-refer. This is precisely the case of (5) and (6). It is true that 
NUMBER does not involve cognitive immediacy as the phenomenal concept 
RED does, but the two concepts have other features that links them a priori 
negatively: number is abstract entities, whereas reddishness is something that 
are instantiated in our head, that we can experience in the world. Their modes of 
existence seem to be radically different, even though we cannot specify what their 
modes are. For this reason, (5) and (6) are false a priori. There is only conceptual 
difference but no conceptual gap between NUMBER and RED. 
Stoljar obviously has conceptual difference in mind when he thinks that Con.l 
follows from A1, or Con.l，from Al，. But since PCS is rather concerned about 
conceptual gap, it is not committed to principles like Con.l or Con.l，. Therefore, 
Stoljar misfires again. 
To elaborate, proponents o fPCS seek to explain the a posteriori status o f ( l ) 
(and the explanatory gap between the phenomenal and physical) not simply in 
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terms of the conceptual difference between phenomenal and physical concepts, 
but of the conceptual gap. First, in introspection, we can directly and substantially 
grasp the properties themselves, and this way of conceiving provides us with no 
physical information that is carried by physical concepts. Second, phenomenal 
concepts are acquired through introspection, and thus they encode no physical 
information—in other words, phenomenal concepts do not represent phenomenal 
properties as physical.^^ Third, unlike the case involving RED and NUMBER, 
phenomenal concepts and physical concepts do not have features that rule out, on 
a priori grounds, the possibility that phenomenal properties are in fact 
physical~the fact that phenomenal concepts represent phenomenal properties as 
physical is compatible with the possibility that phenomenal properties are 
physical. So there is no negative a priori link between phenomenal concepts and 
physical concepts either. For these reasons, phenomenal concepts are isolated 
from physical concepts. 
There is a conceptual gap between PAIN and C-FIBER STIMULATION, but 
only conceptual difference between RED and NUMBER. Therefore, the two cases 
are not analogous. Stoljar falsely presupposes that PCS rests solely on conceptual 
difference and is committed to general principles such as C1' or C1. Since all his 
arguments are based on such principles (to draw counter-examples such as (5) and 
(6)), it is a problem not just for the second argument, but also for the Stoljarian 
argument in general. “ 




I hope we can see clearly where Stoljar's misunderstandings of PCS lie: first, he 
assumes most versions of PCS rely on the experience thesis to explain the a 
posteriori status of (1); second, he assumes that PCS is committed to the claim 
that conceptual difference could explain a posteriority, so that if concept U has 
feature K, and V does not, the relevant conditional is a posteriori. As argued in 
3.2.3 and 3.2.4, both assumptions are false. Moreover, since the derivation from 
A1 (A1') to C1 (Cr) is based on the second assumption, and C1 (or C1', or any 
variations) is indispensibIe for the Stoljarian argument in drawing the alleged 
counterexamples to PCS, it follows that the argument, however modified, does 
not undermine PCS. 
3.3 Chalmers，Objection to PCS 
There is another line of worry about PCS that is not concerned with whether PCS 
can come to an adequate account of the explanatory gap and the a posteriori 
status of physicalism. The worry is rather that, even if PCS can provide such an 
account, it is still open to question that whether PCS is of any substantive help to 
the defense of physicalism. 
Let me explain. Recall that, PCS combines conceptual dualism with 
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ontological monism. According to PCS, the conceptual gap gives rise to the 
epistemic gap between our knowledge of the phenomenal and the physical (D2). 
If successful, the strategy can help us understand why there is such an explanatory 
or epistemic gap. This would be an important contribution. However, it is the 
primary purpose of PCS to defend physicalism, and thus it has to explain the 
conceptual gap in a way that is compatible with physicalism (D3). If it fails to do 
so, then PCS simply introduces another unbridgeable gap (between phenomenal 
and physical properties) in the place ofthe original one (between phenomenal and 
physical truths). Some opponents argue that it is unclear how the new gap could 
be bridged (e.g. Levine 2007); some even claim that it is impossible for advocates 
of PCS to both 1) provide a physicalist account of phenomenal concepts and 2) 
explain the explanatory gap with that account, (e.g. Chalmers 2007) 
In other words, this kind of objection consists of two claims: first, the 
defense of physicalism requires an account of phenomenal concepts that is 
compatible with physicalism; second, it is hard to see how this requirement can be 
satisfied (for some, it is even impossible to be satisfied). This kind of objection is 
exemplified by Chalmers' master argument, to which we now tum. 
3.3.1 Chalmers' MasterArgument 
1 
Chalmers contends that PCS faces a serious dilemma: either phenomenal concepts 
themselves are not physically explicable, or the physicalist account of 
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phenomenal concepts cannot explain our epistemic situation (see below) with 
regard to qualia. Either way, PCS cannot be successful in defending physicalism. 
Following Chalmers, let P be the complete physical truth of the universe, 
and Q be any arbitrary truth about phenomenal consciousness. Advocates of PCS 
agree that P&~Q is conceivable, i.e. zombies are conceivable, and that the 
explanatory gap between P and Q stems from the conceptual gap between 
phenomenal and physical concepts. Now suppose C is the claim that human 
beings have some special feature that PCS uses to explain why we are confronted 
with the explanatory gap. In other words, C is the thesis that attributes some 
special features to human, features which give rise to explanatory gap between P 
and Q. As is explained above, the key feature (at least in the quotational and 
Lorian recognitional account of phenomenal concepts) is phenomenal 
acquaintance, i.e. the immediate way we conceive phenomenal properties. 
An important notion in Chalmers's argument is "epistemic situation." 
According to Chalmers, the epistemic situation of an agent includes two things; 
first, the truth-values ofher beliefs; second, the epistemic status ofher beliefs (e.g. 
whether the beliefs are justified, cognitively significant, etc.) Therefore, two 
agents would share the same epistemic situation "when they have corresponding 
beliefs, all of which have corresponding truth-value and epistemic status." 
(Chalmers 2007:177) 
Chalmers，argument can be summarized briefly as follows: 
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(1) If P&-C is conceivable, then C is not physically explicable. 
(2) IfP&~C is not conceivable, then C cannot explain our epistemic situation. 
(3) Either C is not physically explicable, or C cannot explain our epistemic 
situation. 
The first premise of the argument is based on the connection between 
conceivability and explanation, and thus parallels the line of reasoning that leads 
to the explanatory gap problem: if P&~Q is conceivable (e.g. if zombies are 
conceivable), then Q is not physically explicable. Advocates of PCS generally 
acknowledge this connection and accept the explanatory gap between P and Q, 
and similarly, they have to accept the gap between P and C, if P&~C is 
conceivable. 
However, if proponents of PCS embrace this hom, then it seems that, in its 
explanation of the gap between P and Q, PCS introduces another explanatory gap 
between P and C (i.e. between physical process and phenomenal acquaintance), 
and this second gap is not physically explicable. It is hard to see, then，how any 
real progress can be made in defending physicalism by employing PCS, for the 
new gap is as troublesome as the old one. 
Chalmers，gives an argument for the second premise, which seems less 
obvious than the first one. 
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(4) IfP&~C is not conceivable, then zombies satisfy C" . 
(5) Zombies do not share our epistemic situation. 
(6) If zombies satisfy C but do not share our epistemic situation, then C cannot 
explain our epistemic situation. 
(7) If P&-C is not conceivable, then C cannot explain our epistemic 
situation. 
This is a valid argument. It remains to be seen how the premises arejustified. 
The case for (4): if P&~C is not conceivable, then it is not conceivable that 
our physical twins lack the feature attributed by C (i.e. lacks phenomenal 
acquaintance). That is，zombies satisfy C. 
The case for (6): Let E represents our epistemic situation. If zombies 
satisfy C but do not share our epistemic situation, then C&-E is conceivable. 
Again, due to the connection between conceivability and explanation, it follows 
that C cannot explain E. 
So perhaps the only controversial premise of this argument is (5)，which 
amounts to the claim that P&~E is conceivable. For the sake ofargument, suppose 
zombies have beliefs.�* My zombie twin shares my epistemic situation if it has 
beliefs corresponding to mine. That is，if its beliefs have corresponding 
“ That is, zombies have the feature attributed by C. 
I fzombies do not have beliefs, then probably do not have concepts either. There will then 
be an explanatory gap between physical process and concepts. This leads toward the first hom of 
the dilemma. If, on the other hand, zombies have concepts with the key feature attributed by C, as 
long as they do not have beliefs, C&~E is conceivable, and thus C cannot explain E. This leads' 
toward the second horn of the dilemma. 
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truth-values and epistemic status. 
In support of (5)，Chalmers invites readers to consider Mary's zombie twin: 
zombie Mary. When zombie Mary is released from the black-white room and is 
confronted with ripe tomato, what would it leam? Chalmers says, 
It is plausible that Zombie Mary at least gains certain abilities. For 
example, upon seeing a red thing, she will gain the ability to perceptually 
classify red things together. It is also reasonable to suppose that Zombie 
Mary will gain certain indexical knowledge, of the form Iam in this state 
now, where this state functions indexically to pick out whatever state she 
is in. But this knowledge is analogous to trivial indexical knowledge of the 
form It is this time now, and is equally cognitively insignificant. There is 
no reason to believe that Zombie Mary will gain cognitively significant 
introspective knowledge, analogous to the cognitively significant 
knowledge that Mary gains. On the face of it, there is nothing for Zombie 
Mary to gain knowledge of. For Zombie Mary, all is dark inside, so even 
confronting her with a new sort of stimulus will not bring about new 
significant introspective knowledge." (Chalmers 2007:178) 
The moral of this scenario, Chalmers suggests, is that nothing zombie Mary learns 
is comparable to Mary's new knowledge in terms of cognitive significance. 
Therefore, zombie Mary does not share Mary's epistemic situation. To generalize, 
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zombies do not share our epistemic situation. 
If proponents of PCS grant that C (i.e. the fact that we have phenomenal 
acquaintance) cannot explain our epistemic situation with regard to qualia (that is, 
C cannot explain why we have true, justified and cognitively significant beliefs 
about qualia), then, according to Chalmers, they have to concede that C cannot 
explain why we are confronted with the explanatory gap about qualia as well^^ 
However, this would be an unacceptable concession, because it is the very 
purpose ofPCS to explain the explanatory gap. 
3.3.2 Balog's Reply 
As is perhaps obvious now, the central issue underlying Chalmers，master 
argument is the physical explicability of C. It is precisely at this point that several 
leading proponents of PCS try to meet Chalmers’ challenge (Levin 2008, Balog 
Forthcoming). In this section, to illustrate their defense, I will briefly present 
Katalin Balog's reply^^ 
In effect, Balog accepts both homs of the dilemma, but she maintains that 
this will not bring about an extra problem for PCS. This is, she argues, because 
the gap between P and C, like the one between P and Q, is rooted in the 
conceptual gap between phenomenal and physical concepts. If the explanatory 
gap between P and Q is compatible with physicalism, so is the one between P and 
35 I don't think this point about the relation between epistemic situation and explanatory gap is 
g)rrect. I'll take it for granted now and retum to it in 3.3.4. 
As I see it, Balog and Levin's reply are similar in many important respects 
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c. 
According to Balog, C can be conceptualized not only using phenomenal 
terms, but using physical terms as well (Call these two conceptualizations CPhen 
and CPhys respectively). Although Balog does not make it quite explicit why 
this is case, the reason seems to be something like this: on the one hand, C is the 
claim that we can have phenomenal acquaintance, and in our phenomenal 
acquaintance, phenomenal properties are presented to us as phenomenal, not as 
physical-functional？^ Therefore, there is a sense in which the phenomenal aspect 
cannot be eliminated from C. For this reason, there must be CPhen. On the other 
hand, phenomenal acquaintance is a mental fact, and (supposing identity 
physicalism is true) all mental facts are identical to some physical (neurological, 
in particular) facts. Therefore, C can be couched in physical terms. The result 
would be CPhys. For the ease of exposition, we may say that CPhen is about our 
phenomenal acquaintance, and CPhys is about the neurological correlates of our 
phenomenal acquaintance. 
Now equipped with these two conceptualizations of C, Balog claims that 
both horns of the dilemma are acceptable to PCS. To elaborate: 
The first horn—if P&~C is conceivable, then C is not physically 
explicable—should be formulated in terms of CPhen, so it becomes 
{XPhen) l{V8c-CPhen is conceivable, then CPhen is not physically explicable. 
37 1 This is compatible with the possibility that phenomenal properties are in fact 
physical-functional. 
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Because of the conceptual gap between phenomenal and physical concepts, 
creatures that are physically identical to us but lack the feature (i.e. phenomenal 
acquaintance) attributed by CPhen are conceivable. Therefore, PSc�CPhen is 
conceivable, and CPhen is not physically explicable. 
In the meanwhile, the second hom (If P&-C is not conceivable, then C cannot 
explain our epistemic situation) is acceptable if C is couched in physical terms. 
{2Phys) If P&�CPhys is not conceivable, then CPhys cannot explain our 
epistemic situation. 
Since P is the complete physical truth that includes CPhys，P&~ CPhys is not 
conceivable. Since zombies do not share our epistemic situation, CFhen&-CPhys 
is conceivable. Therefore, CPhen cannot explain our epistemic situation. The 
conclusion of Chalmers，master argument thus would be: 
(3)* Either CPhen is not physically explicable, or CPhys cannot explain our 
epistemic situation. 
The dilemma, then, is dissolved: both horns are acceptable to physicalists, and 
(3)* is compatible with the possibility that CPhys is physically explicable and 
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CPhen can explain our epistemic situation. That is, under appropriate 
conceptualizations, C is both physically explicable and able to explain our 
epistemic situation. Of course, much work is needed to flesh the details, but it 
seems that at least in principle, there is no a priori reason to rule out the 
possibility that both explanatory tasks can be carried out. In any case, Chalmers’ 
challenge targets at this very possibility. 
Admittedly, there is an explanatory gap between P and QPhen.^ ^ However, 
this gap mirrors the original gap between P and Q, as both gaps stem from the 
physical-phenomenal conceptual gap. Therefore, Balog contends, Chalmers’ 
master argument does not raise any extra problem to physicalism. Proponents of 
PCS have an answer to the original explanatory gap problem, so they will not be 
troubled by the alleged new gap, which in fact parallels the old one. In other 
words, proponents of PCS believe that, the new explanatory gap between P and 
QPhen cannot rule out the possibility that some physical statement (i.e. CPhys) and 
CPhen express the same fact, just as the original gap cannot rule out the possibility 
that the phenomenal properties are identical to some physical properties. For 
Balog, these possibilities are sufficient for the defense of physicalism because 
they show that physicalism is compatible with the explanatory gap between 
phenomenal and physical: given the explanatory gap, it is still possible that 
physicalism is true.. 
38 Although she says almost nothing about how, exactly, CPhys and E are explained. 
39 The case is similar with regard to the gap between CPhys and E 
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3.3.3 A Worry about BaIog's Reply 
Many of us have the dualistic intuition, which appears to be in tension with 
physicalism. We feel that it is hard to see how phenomenal properties could in 
some way be physical. PCS suggests that there is an unbridgeable explanatory gap 
between physical properties and phenomenal properties, not because they are 
different properties, but because our ways to conceive them are sharply different 
or isolated from each other. PCS is promising in dissolving^® the explanatory gap 
problem, precisely because the way we conceive phenomenal properties at least 
appears easier (than phenomenal properties themselves) to tackle in physical 
terms. This is because the way we conceive phenomenal properties can be 
understood as some special form of mental representation, and presumably, for 
physicalists, the problem of mental representation more tractable than the problem 
of phenomenal experience，' 
However, Balog's reply, in its essence, gives up this very promise: she 
distinguishes CPhys from CPhen, and claims that there is an explanatory gap 
between P and CPhen. This new gap parallels the original gap between physical 
processes and qualia. In short, phenomenal acquaintance is not physically 
explicable42. Therefore, the way of conceiving phenomenal properties is no more 
40 Proponents o f P C S do not think that the explanatory gap between physical and the 
phenomenal can be solved in the sense that the gap is bridged. Rather, they agree with dualists that 
the explanatory gap cannot be bridged; nonetheless, they think the explanatoty gap can be 
explained in a way that is compatible with physicalism. 
41 More on this point, see 3.3.5. 
42 In the same way, phenomenal properties are not physically explicable. Suppose physicalism 
is true, then a more precise way to put this point is that, phenomenal properties, when represented 
as phenomenal properties, are not physically explicable, but they are, at least in principle, 
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tractable than the phenomenal properties themselves. 
Therefore, Balog's reply, though coherent, would sacrifice much of the initial 
attractiveness of PCS. Without a physicalist explanation of phenomenal 
acquaintance (or something near enough), it seems that she simply assumes that 
phenomenal acquaintance is a physical fact: an assumption dualist would deny. 
For this reason, it is hard to see how PCS could make any substantive progress in 
the physicalist-dualist dialectics, or how her defense could persuade dualists. In a 
way, she acknowledges this problem. She describes the situation facing both 
physicalist and dualists as "a stalemate", where "Neither side can, without 
begging the question against the opponent, show that the other's position is 
untenable. Where you end up depends on what you take as your starting point. 
And, as far as I can see, neither side has a privileged start." (Balog Forthcoming: 
1 9 ) 
Perhaps she is right. Nevertheless, I don't think we should end the game so 
hastily. Instead, it seems to me that to defend physicalism, one need not to 
account phenomenal acquaintance (i.e. the immediate relation between us and 
phenomenal properties) in physical terms (she can't, anyway, if phenomenal 
acquaintance essentially involves the phenomenal aspect); probably something 
near enough would suffice: namely, a physical account of acquaintance itself (i.e. 
the immediate cognitive relation itself). This at least appears easier because the 
acquaintance is independent of the content being acquainted (qualia). In other 
physically explicable when represented as physical properties. 
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words, the cognitively immediate relation is independent, at least conceptually，of 
the relata (we and qualia). If qualia are the root of all the problems facing 
p h y s i c a l i s m ， 4 3 and acquaintance itself does not essentially involve qualia, then 
explaining acquaintance at least appears more tractable from a physicalist point of 
view. 
In 3.3.5，I will try to explore this line of thoughts and sketch an alternative 
reply to Chalmers. Before that, however, I will point out a problem in the way 
Chalmers phrases his objection, so as to further clarify the issues we are 
investigating. 
3.3.4 Epistemic Situation and the Explanatory Gap 
For Chalmers, our epistemic situation with regard to qualia gives rise to the 
explanatory gap problem, so to explain the explanatory gap, one has to explain 
our epistemic situation. For example, in his introduction to the core commitments 
of PCS, he writes, "Proponents [of PCS] put forward a thesis C attributing 
certain psychological features~call these the key features一to human beings...C 
explains our epistemic situation with regard to consciousness: C explains why we 
are confronted with the relevant distinctive epistemic gaps" (Chalmers 2007:172) 
On the face of it, this linkage between our epistemic situation and the 
explanatory gap seems hard to deny. Consider, for example, the case of zombie. 
43 To be sure, there are dualist arguments that are based on other considerations (e.g. about the 
unity ofconsciousness), but I think it is widely acknowledged that the most difficult problem 
facing physicalism is qualia. 
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As Chalmers puts it, 
...when we conceive of zombies, we are not conceiving of beings 
whose inner life is as rich as ours, but different in character. We are 
conceiving of beings whose inner life is dramatically poorer than our own. 
And this difference in inner lives makes for dramatic difference in the 
richness of our introspective knowledge. Where we have substantial 
knowledge of our phenomenal inner lives, zombies have no analogous 
introspective knowledge: there is nothing analogous for them to have 
introspective knowledge of. (Chalmers 2007: 186) 
It is tempting, then，to think that in the zombie world the explanatory gap 
problem will not arise because zombies do not share our epistemic situation, i.e., 
they do not have the beliefs that correspond to our own. 
The last sentence in the passage quoted above is important: zombies have no 
introspective knowledge that corresponds to our phenomenal knowledge (i.e. they 
do not share our epistemic situation) because "there is nothing analogous for them 
to have introspective knowledge of，，or, in other words, because zombies do not 
inner states that analogous to qualia. It seems then, the issue surrounding 
epistemic situation turns on what we can introspect and we have introspective 
knowledge of. Since (as Chalmers assumes) the explanatory gap problem is given 
rise by our epistemic situation with regard to qualia, and the epistemic situation is 
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a matter of what we can introspect (and zombies cannot) introspect, i.e. qualia, it 
follows that, ultimately, the explanatory gap stems from qualia. 
However, this is precisely what proponents of PCS deny: they hold that the 
explanatory gap (and the conceivability of zombies) is not given rise by what we 
conceive in introspection (i.e. qualia), but how we conceive them (i.e. via 
phenomenal acquaintance). Our epistemic situation, which is based on what we 
conceive, has no special importance in PCS's explanation of the explanatory gap. 
Therefore, Chalmers is wrong in claiming that PCS aims to explain the 
explanatory gap by explaining our epistemic situation; he begs the question if he 
claims that, to explain the explanatory gap, one must explain our epistemic 
situation. 
However, this problem does not constitute a knockdown argument against 
Chalmers; rather, it should be seen as a call for modifying his dilemma. The 
modified dilemma can be put as this: "Either C is not physically explicable, or C 
cannot explain the explanatory gap." Much of the intuitive force of his original 
dilemma can be retained. 
C is the claim that we have phenomenal acquaintance of qualia, and I have 
argued earlier (in section 3.2.3) how phenomenal acquaintance could help explain 
the explanatory gap. So we should reject second hom. On the other hand, as noted 
earlier in my discussion of Balog's reply, since phenomenal acquaintance 
essentially involve the phenomenal aspect, it seems we have to embrace the first 
horn ofthe dilemma, i.e. that C is not physically explicable. 
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Balog thinks this inexplicability does not bring about any extra problem for 
physicalism, since, just as with the case of the inexplicability of phenomenal 
property, it is rooted in the conceptual gap between phenomenal and physical 
concepts. I have explained why her response is not quite satisfying. Now I tum to 
explore another reply to the modified dilemma. 
3.3.5 An Alternative Reply: Some Speculations 
In this section, I present an alternative line of response to Chalmers. The response 
is sketchy, and in some places, largely speculative. To fill in the details, one needs 
a comprehensive theory of mental presentation, which is beyond the scope of this 
essay. Therefore, the reply in this section should be taken as a direction for further 
research rather than a conclusive answer to Chalmers’ challenge. 
The essential feature of phenomenal acquaintance, as noted in 3.2.3，is 
cognitive immediacy, i.e. the direct and substantive way that we grasp the 
phenomenal properties via introspection. Cognitive immediacy consists in the 
immediate relation between us and phenomenal properties (of our own 
phenomenal experiences), rather than the relata. Because in introspection we 
are related to phenomenal properties in an immediate manner, our introspection 
associates no physical-functional descriptions with phenomenal properties; 
» 
instead, we simply demonstrate these properties. So, phenomenal concepts, which 
are acquired through introspection, do not associate physical-functional 
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descriptions with relevant phenomenal properties. Therefore, phenomenal 
concepts are conceptually isolated with physical-functional concepts. In short, it is 
this immediate relation that gives rise to the epistemic gap between the way we 
conceive phenomenal and the way we conceive physical properties. 
Furthermore, this cognitive relation or access could be understood as some 
special form of mental presentation (i.e. we have cognitive access to something 
because we represent it in certain way), and presumably, for physicalists, the 
problem of mental presentation is more tractable than the problem of phenomenal 
c o n s c i o u s n e s s . 4 4 It is this second point that makes PCS initially appealing and 
promising as a defense of physicalism. PCS directs our attention from the hard 
problem of qualia to an easier problem of mental representation (at least appears 
to be an easier problem): while acknowledging there is an explanatory gap 
between physical process and qualia, advocates of PCS maintain that the gap is 
precisely one should expect, given the special form of mental representation of 
our own inner states. 
Moreover, cognitive immediacy is independent, at least conceptually, of the 
contents (e.g. phenomenal states) that are represented in a cognitively immediate 
way. It might be an empirical fact, as most of the higher order theories of 
consciousness suggest, that a mental state has phenomenal character only if it is 
represented by some higher order states (e.g. higher order thought or p e r c e p t i o n f . 
In any case, it is at least conceivable that, in their introspection, some creatures 
44 This is granted even by some of the most prominent dualists. See Chalmers 1996. 
45 For higher order thought theory , see Rosenthal (2003); for higher order perception theory, 
see Lycan (2004) 
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can afford cognitive immediacy with regard to non-phenomenal states. 
Consider, for example, what we may call quasi-zombies: they are similar to 
zombies in that they are physical duplicates of human beings, but they lack 
phenomenal states; however, unlike zombies, they have some non-phenomenal 
inner states that play exactly the same role as our phenomenal states. Call these 
states schnomenal states. For example, as Mary experience phenomenal redness, 
quasi-zombie Mary would experience shenomenal redness (whatever that is). 
Quasi-zombie Mary also has introspective acquaintance (i.e. schenomenal 
acquaintance) with her own schnonmenal states. 
Nothing in that scenario is intrinsically incoherent or inconceivable (in the 
sense that the scenario cannot be ruled out a priori), as Chalmers，acknowledges 
(Chalmers 2007: 186). The difference between human and quasi-zombies lies 
only on what inner states are represented with cognitive immediacy: in human 
beings, they are phenomenal states; in quasi-zombies, they are schnomenal 
states.46 
Correspondingly, we may construe "schenomnenal acquaintance" as 
follows (S', e' 0，are the counterparts of S, e, 0): 
Schnomenal acquaintance: S' has schnomenal acquaintance with 0，in the 
sense that when S introspectively attends to e', S' can grasp 0，in a cognitively 
9 
immediate way (i.e. directly and substantially). 
46 So an explanatory gap problem (between schnomenal properties and physical processes) 
will arise in the quasi-zombie world. 
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My point, to repeat, is just that nothing about cognitive immediacy hangs 
particularly on qualia (and in general, the content of acquaintance); hence, the 
explanation of cognitive immediacy is independent of the explanation of qualia 
(and in general, the content of acquaintance). This will provide some relief to 
proponents ofPCS, for whom qualia are inexplicable in physical terms. 
Therefore, if we can explain cognitive immediacy, the explanation could be 
couched in topic-neutral (e.g. functional) terms, in the sense that it leaves open 
the question whether the represented inner state are phenomenal or not. But how, 
exactly, can we explain it? 
Here are some speculations. Let e be a phenomenal state. To have 
phenomenal acquaintance of e is to have a mental representation e* of e, and e is 
identical with e*. The directness of acquaintance is explained by the fact that 
there is no representational mediation between e and e*, or, in other words, e* has 
e as its representational content simply in virtue of itself; the substantivenss of 
acquaintance is explained by the fact that e* is identical to e, and thus in 
representing e by e*, one grasps all there is to undergo e. In short, e is represented 
as it is.47Again, as I see it, nothing in this picture hangs on the fact the e is a 
phenomenal state. 
Obviously, this picture is oversimplified. Moreover, the fact the e* is 
identical with e does not explain how e* represents e. Admittedly, there are 
47 I'm indebted to Kelly Trogdon on this account of phenomenal acquaintance. For details, see 
Trogdon, manuscript 
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several competing theories of mental representation on the market,^^ and it is far 
from clear which, if any, will turns out to be the correct one. On the other hand, it 
seems to me that in principle, a more or less correct theory of mental 
representation will be available to physicalists. Or at least I cannot see why it will 
not be so. In any case, Chalmers himself acknowledges that, for physicalists, the 
problem of mental representation is easier than the problem of phenomenal 
consciousness. (Chalmers 1996) 
Still, one might worry that it is hard to see how the explanation of 
phenomenal acquaintance can figure into the physical world. It is hard to see, that 
is, in a world of atoms, waves, and other physical entities and processes, how a 
phenomenal state e* can represent e, while e* and e themselves are not physically 
explicable. In fact, this kind of worry is open to two different interpretations: 
either it is about why phenomenal states exist’ or it is about how phenomenal 
states represent. If the former, then the worry is irrelevant, for PCS has granted 
that phenomenal properties are physically inexplicable. If the later, then it is a 
worry about mental representation, i.e. how mental representation is possible in a 
physical world. Even if this worry is legitimate, it is everyone's problem, not a 
problem for PCS in particular. 
To conclude this section: first, to explain the explanatory gap, one needs only 
to explain the cognitive immediate relation between us and phenomenal properties; 
second, the explanation of cognitive immediacy is in fact an explanation of (some 
48 Most notoriously: the causal-informational theories, teleological theories, and conceptual 
role theories. For an introduction, see Botterill and Carruthers, 1999, chapter 7. 
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special forms of) mental representation, and is (at least conceptually) independent 
of the explanation of phenomenality or qualia; third, a correct explanation of 
mental representation, in principle, will be available (to physicalists). From these 
premises, it follows that the explanation, in principle, is available to physicalists. 
3.3.6 Conclusion 
Chalmers lists four possible responses to his master argument: first, accepting the 
first hom, i.e. that P cannot explain C, but holding that PCS still has its force; 
second, accepting the second hom, i.e. that C cannot explain E, but holding that 
PCS still has its force; third, denying the second horn by holding that C & � E is 
conceivable and that zombies indeed shares our epistemic situation; fourth, 
denying the connection between conceivability and explanation. Balog's response, 
in fact, embraces both horns by invoking different conceptualizations of C. 
My response, in effect, is to accept the first horn. Let me summarize. First, I 
agree that P cannot explain C^^  because (1) C is about phenomenal acquaintance, 
in which the phenomenal aspect is irreducible, (2) the phenomenal is not 
physically explicable; Second, (and this is where I agree with Balog), the gap 
between P and C does pose an extra problem: it parallels the original explanatory 
gap (between P and Q) in that both stem from the phenomenal-physical 
49 Another way to phrase this point is that C is a thesis about acquaintance rather than 
phenomenal acquaintance. In that case, I would disagree that C is not physically explicable. 
Correspondingly, other points below should be rephrased. But nothing here is substantial. I choose 
C to be a thesis about phenomenal acquaintance simply for convenience, as both Chalmers and 
Balog take C to be phenomenal acquaintance in my sense. 
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conceptual gap; Third (and this is where I diverge from Balog), PCS is not thus 
trivialized. This is because the key to phenomenal acquaintance is cognitive 
immediacy or acquaintance itself, rather than the content of acquaintance. This 
immediacy can be understood in terms of some special forms of mental 
representation, and once we have (it is possible in principle at least) an adequate 
theory of mental representation, we may be able to explain cognitive immediacy 
too. 
I have said much of the above is quite speculative, so let me end with a 
concession. Perhaps it turns out that the kind of mental representation that 
explains cognitive immediacy is much more intricate than I have imagined. It is 
even possible that the form of mental representation cannot be couched in 
topic-neutral terms after all. If this is the case, my argument above will fail. This 
is the reason why I do not regard my reply to Chalmers as anything as a bold 
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